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THE PRINCIPLE OF "HARM" IN THE CONCEPT OF
CRIME: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CRIMINALLY PROTECTED LEGAL INTERESTS
ALBIN ESER*
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to most continental European criminal theories, in which the
notion of harm-defined as a violation of some legally protected interest
-plays a key role in determining criminality, Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence has paid little attention to the theoretical exploration and
practical employment of the principle of harm.
There are, of course, numerous cases in which judges speak of "harm,"
"evil consequences," or "injurious effects" resulting from criminal conduct' or where the harm is considered by the violated statute in determining the criminal sanction.' Scholars also seem increasingly interested in
the principle of harm and recognize it as one of the basic notions of the
concept of crime.
And yet, with the exception of Jerome Hall, Gerhard 0. W. Mueller
and Orvill C. Snyder, there are few legal theorists who really present a
clear and comprehensive view of the meaning of "harm." Thus, it is not
improper to state, along with Professor Mueller, that "the principle of
harm is the most underdeveloped concept in our criminal law."3
This statement should evoke some surprise, since harm is the very
essence of the crime or, as Hall calls it, the "fulcrum between criminal
conduct and the punitive sanction." 4 Besides its constitutional relevance,
the principle of harm can also illuminate shadowed elements of the crime.
* D.J., University of Wurzburg; M.C.L., New York University. Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Tubingen, Germany.
Editor's Note: This is the final article in a four part Criminal Law Symposium, which
is dedicated by its authors to the memory of the late Professor Paul W. Tappan, whom the
world of criminology lost too soon. The three previously published articles appeared at: 3
DUTQUESNE U.L. REv. 137; 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 97; 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 225.
t I would like to thank Professor Gerhard 0. W. Mueller of New York University and
Professor Tenney of Nebraska University for their invaluable suggestions and assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Respublica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 334, 1 L. Ed. 163 (1788); State v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 13 N.J. Super. 172, 80 A.2d 342 (1951).
2. See United States v. Rubinstein, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 22 C.M.R. 131 (1957); People
v. Von Rosen, 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
3. Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence
and Criminal Theory, 34 IND. L.J. 206, 220 (1959).
4. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
GENERAL PRINCIPLES].
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The principle of harm may appear in many areas, but it is sufficient
here simply to state the most important functions the harm requirement
is designed to serve.
First, harm is an essential substantive element of every crime. It may
even be called the ratio essendi of the crime,' for it is the criminal harm
inflicted that makes the perpetrator's conduct sanctionable. In addition,
since the evidence of harm is an external result, the requirement of a
certain proscribed harm is valuable as a criterion in order to distinguish
criminal conduct from merely immoral behavior (i.e., from pure ethics).
Second, in its function as an essential "organizational construct"' of
the crime concept, the notion of harm is of major importance with respect
to the specific nature of the various special crimes and for an explanation
of other elements of the crime concept. First we must consider the construction and interpretation of the definition of the crime per se and its
related problem of legality. Frequently, the question of the normative
range of a particular criminal prohibition can only be answered by examining the legal interest which the statute is designed to protect. Merely
analyzing the statutory definition of the crime does not always lead to a
satisfactory answer; only an inquiry into the harm it is designed to prevent will make a proper interpretation possible. Analogously the proof of
legality, i.e., whether all factual and legal elements and circumstances of
a statutory definition are met, cannot be found except through an interpretation of statutory intent-ascertaining the harm against which the
prohibition is directed.
However, the harm principle as an "organizational construct" reaches
still further in the determination of other crime elements, such as the
substance of mens rea, the punishability of attempt, or the validity of
consent by the offended person. Also, the problems of causation, merger,
and double jeopardy can be brought closer to solution by considering
them in their relation to the principle of harm.
The concept of harm may well be useful in the measurement of punishment. Once we know that harm consists in the impairment of certain
legally recognized interests and that it acquires a certain gravity and
quality in terms of the specific interest which it opposes, a rational basis
for differentiating punishment in proportion to the harm inflicted emerges.
In light of the examination thus far, the principle of harm might seem
only to be of theoretical interest. Perhaps this was the reason why AngloAmerican jurisprudence, in its strong pragmatic tradition and its general
5. In this sense harm, indeed, has a fundamental place among Hall's seven "general
principles of criminal law": see HALL, GENERAL PNCIPLES 18; also his STUDIEs IN JURiSPRUDENCE AND CRIMNAL THEORY 10 (1958) [hereinafter cited as STUDIES].
6. HALL'S phrase, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 222.
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aversion to mere theoretical speculation,7 paid it little attention until
today. The comparatively recent development of modern regulatory offenses has made it a matter of important constitutional concern; the harm
requirement emerges as more than an academic exercise.
In traditional common law crimes, which dealt with the basic impairments of human rights and interests, the presence of harm was so apparent
that there was no need for special emphasis on its requirement. In contradistinction, the objects of modern welfare offenses are usually so minor in
scope and so highly technical in nature that they are often scarcely recognizable. In all such cases, a vital question arises as to the proper legislative
boundaries of penalizing certain human actions. For example, may a
legislature validly outlaw acts which, in fact, are not likely to do harm
at all? If not, of what must the nature and quality of the harm consist
in order to be penalized by a criminal sanction? Let us relate these theoretical considerations to practical application: is photographing for compensation without a license a "wrong" which deserves criminal punishment? Or, what is the purpose of a statute which limits gasoline price signs
to a certain size while a farmer or car manufacturer may advertise his
products with placards as large as he pleases?
These and similar products of modern penal legislation compel us to
reexamine the material substance of crime. If we inquire about what harm
conduct must cause in order to be punishable, we not only raise a theoretical question but we also undertake a fight for the freedom of human
activity which, in our day, is threatened by a state anxious to be protected
against activities which are perhaps quite harmless.
This article could not possibly answer all the questions raised. This
survey seeks only to point out why a further elucidation and reevaluation
of the principle of harm is urgently needed and to indicate the many respects in which the notion of harm is of essential importance in the determination of other phenomena of criminal law and legislation.
I.

HARM AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CRIMINAL WRONG
The best approach to the problem of harm commences with a determination of the position this element occupies within the concept of crime.
Considering harm without knowing its systematic status and its normative
significance leads one easily to speculation, thus rendering the analysis
and elucidation of harm all the more difficult. Our first task, therefore,
will be to delimit the function of harm in the crime concept.
Harm and Formal Unlawfulness
Although "crime" as a general concept is a compound phenomenon of
factual as well as legal, objective as well as subjective, factors and circum7. See GusTAv

RADBRUCH, DER GEIST DES ENGLISCBEN RECHTS

5-15 (1958).
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stances which are interrelated, we can theoretically distinguish between
the state of mind of the perpetrator and the exterior effects of his conduct.
Whereas subjective personal factors pertain primarily to the question of
personal imputability (i.e., mens rea, personal guilt), objective elements
(such as the overt act, the breach of the law, the causation of the proscribed effect) constitute what may be called the "criminal wrong." Since
the prevention of a criminal wrong is the very purpose of a criminal
provision, the criminal wrong is an essential element of any crime.
A more difficult question arises: of what does the criminal wrong consist? If we look only to the most obvious effect of a criminal act, we
immediately notice the breach of law, for, since the criminal wrong is the
product of an illegal (i.e., prohibited) act, any crime necessarily contains
a violation of some formal legal provision which prohibits or commands
certain conduct. It cannot be doubted that such violation of a penal provision is a form of harm to the public which stands behind the law. But,
since this kind of disobedience appears in any crime, it is not a distinctive
criterion for explaining and illustrating the peculiar character of a crime.
In accordance with Gerhard 0. W. Mueller's position,8 this disobedience
can be considered as harm only in its general or broad sense; but this
sort of harm is an essential structural element of any crime. It may be
called the "formal" wrong of the crime, a wrong distinct from the harm
which, beyond the mere breach of the law, turns the premeditated killing
of a human being into murder and forced sexual intercourse with a woman
into rape. The substantial element-which varies from one crime to
another because it is the specific object of the crime and thus gives each
crime its peculiar character as either larceny, perjury or traffic violationmay be called the "material" wrong of the crime. Harm in the sense of a
"material" wrong denotes the fact that the crime, in addition to the mere
breach of the law, injured the object which the criminal provision is designed to protect.
Although we must leave the exact determination of the nature of harm
to a later stage of this investigation, we can at this point state that criminal
wrong means more than the formal unlawfulness of breaching the law;
it also consists of some sort of material harm.
One may wonder, therefore, why most statutory crime definitions, as
well as many treatise crime definitions, do not mention this material
wrong-only formal unlawfulness is considered. If, for example, we take
the crime definition of section 2 of the New York Penal Code, which
reads: "A crime is an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable
by death or imprisonment.

we receive the impression that the wrong

8. Supra note 3.
9. Similarly the FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 1: "An infraction which the laws punish with
an effective or shameful penalty is a crime."
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of the crime consists only in the disobedience of a legal command or
prohibition.
The apprehension of crime, which apparently is the theoretical background of this and similar definitions, is not only inadequate, but is also
dangerous. Such a definition makes it all too easy for authoritarian lawmakers to enforce their self-protective criminal measures by pointing to
the purely formal character of such crime definitions (which fail to contain any reference to the purpose upon which all penal commands must
be based), thus allowing the legislature to supply the purpose when and
if it pleases.
Our first task, therefore, will be to demonstrate that the notion of harm
comprises more than mere formal disobedience of the law. This can be
accomplished not only by tracing the historical development of the crime
concept, but also by demonstrating that many common law and civil law
scholars of criminal law recognize harm as a material element of the
criminal wrong.
Historical Considerations
It is rather paradoxical that, originally, purely private wrongs, those
directed against the goods of individuals, lost their substantive material
character and merged into a more formalistic concept of crime which
views the essence of the criminal wrong as the breach of the law or disobedience against the state.
As far as the historical origins of present crimes are concerned, it is
irrelevant how we answer the old question concerning the distinction between tort and crime, viz., whether there ever was a distinction of this
kind at all, as contended by Roscoe Pound" and Max Weber," or whether
even the early legal systems differentiated crimes as public wrongs and
torts as purely private wrongs.
Holdsworth, who represented the latter view,' discovered a number of
offenses which could not be recompensed with money, such as violations
of the religious or moral sense or offenses against the organization of the
community. It was but a natural consequence that such offenses were to
be dealt with by the king.
In a more recent investigation which reached the same result, Mueller
concluded that both the old Germanic and Roman laws, as well as other
ancient legal systems, drew a distinction between purely private wrongs
10. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 90 (1930).
11. RECaTSSOZIOLOGIE 92-95 (Winckelmann ed. 1960). Cf., also Mueller, Tort, Crime,
and the Primitive, 46 J. CRim. L., CIM. & P.S. 303-304 (1955). A difference between tort
and crime is also denied by KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 1 et seq. (17th ed. by
Turner, 1958).
12. HOLDSWORTH, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW 48 (3d ed. 1927).
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(delicta privata) and wrongs with which the community or its sovereign
had to deal (delicta publica).
Whatever theory we follow, it remains true that both tort claims and
public prosecutions were instituted for the restitution or prevention of
injuries done to certain goods, interests, or rights of the individual member of the community (delicta privata) or to the community itself (crimina
publica). The main reason for a claim or prosecution was not, therefore,
the breach of the law, but rather the corporeal injury to such valuable
goods as life, body, property, etc. Thus, the idea of a formal unlawfulness
in addition to the material harm was not possible prior to a more developed conceptualization of the crime concept. In English legal history this
tendency towards abstracting the crime into a breach of the law and, thus,
a disobedience against the king, was originally commenced by the device
of the "king's peace." 4 This was at first purely a jurisdictional matter.
Pollock & Maitland 15 described it in this way: at one time the king's protection was not universal but territorial. Only the king's family and house,
the king's attendants and servants, and other persons personally chosen
by him, were protected by the power of the king and his courts. In view
of the king's strong interest in preserving the manpower of his country
by suppressing the blood feud' 6 and his interest in solidifying his own
personal position, it was natural that the king's peace, and with it his
jurisdiction, was steadily extended beyond his household and court to the
king's highways and finally to the whole country, culminating as the
normal shield and safeguard of public order.' Strangely enough, this
jurisdictional expansion of the king's peace also had a great influence on
the concept of the criminal wrong. Since a breach of the king's peace was
considered an act of personal disobedience to the sovereign, the people
and their interests were better protected through inclusion in the king's
peace. As time passed, therefore, the king's peace was not protected for
its own sake; it safeguarded individual or social interests. However; these
very interests were slowly absorbed by, or at least integrated into, the
king's interest in public peace and security.
13. Mueller, supra note 11, at 309-10. With regard to the Roman law (12 tables),
Mueller follows a distinction already suggested by REIN, DAS CRIMINALRECHT DER R5MER
(1844):
(i) acts against piety and removal of the sacred boundary stones,
(ii) crimina publica, crimes against the existence of the state, esp. treason and
conspiracy,
(iii) private wrongs; but here the state may have had an interest in enforcing the
proper observation of the limits of the talio.
14. As to the development of Kdnigsfriede and Volksfriede in the German law see H.
BRUNNER, 2 DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICETE §§ 65-66 (1892).
15. 1 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 22 (1895).
16. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 50-51.
17. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 15, at 23.
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Through this steady process of converting the harms to individuals into
harms to the interests of the king or, later, the state, the real harm of
crimes caused by the impairment of certain rights and goods was forgotten; the disobedience against the king or the state emerged as the
substance of the crime. From this point it was but a short step to the
recognition of the crime as a public wrong consisting in the commission
or omission of an act either prohibited or compelled by law.
In times like ours when individual freedom is seriously threatened by
a flood of regulations, the purposes of which too frequently seem obscure,
it is essential that one examines the origins of criminal liability. From this
examination it may be learned that criminal prohibitions are justified only
if made for purposes and interests which are worthy of such protection.
We need, therefore, to reexamine the basis of criminal liability. We need
to discover once again the true substance of that which justice requires
must be sanctioned. In this search, legal history demonstrates that the
predominance of formal unlawfulness in many current crime definitions
is merely an historical product of the notion that individual and social
interests are best protected if identified with the king's interests. Nonetheless, we should not be led erroneously to conclude that the wrong of
the crime consists only in the violation of the king's or state's commands,
i.e., the law. Rather, it should always be understood that the formal
breach of the law has its material substance in the impairment of the
interests the law is designed to protect.
As far as general statutory definitions of crime are concerned, a rare
unanimity exists among most states. Nowhere can a definition be found
which even considers the principle of harm or describes the material wrong
of the crime. Most definitions simply speak of the crime as an act or
omission in violation of a law with punishment annexed to it."8
A more colorful picture is presented by the definitions submitted by
scholars, most of whom have their own definitions of crime. This is of no
great significance as long as there is a difference only in the wording. However, since crime definitions are usually conditioned by the author's idea of
law in general, the difference between inconsistent definitions becomes
one of the essence and is, therefore; irreconcilable if the underlying legal
conceptions are basically different. Nevertheless, when reviewing the
history of the attempts to define the nature of crime, we can recognize a
distinct line of development commencing with an initial indifference toward the problems of crime definitions in attempting to describe the
formal nature of crime and terminating with the present trend of an
increasing inclination toward a material concept of crime.
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Cf. also CAL. PENAL CoDE sec. 15; OxLAHOMA STATUTES art. 21 sec. 3; TExAs PENAL CODE arts. 47, 48.
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Let us consider the definitions of crime enunciated by early legal
scholars. Edward Coke found no need for a definition of crime, a fact
possibly attributable to the then unbroken feeling for the true substance
of the crime. At any rate, he opened his work on crimes with the question
of capacity to commit crimes.' 9 His answer is interesting in so far as he
says that in criminal cases the "act and wrong" of a madman shall not
be imputed to him. Coke thus makes a clear distinction between the criminal action and the criminal result, i.e., the wrong. But what does he mean
by "wrong"? A breach of the law? Harm to legal interests? Coke gives no
answer.
William Blackstone presented a more detailed proposition. Due to a
more highly developed stage of legal abstraction, Blackstone defined crime
as "an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it."20 In these words, repeated by many others,
Blackstone's definition is an excellent example of those concepts which
think only of the formal unlawfulness as manifested by a breach of the
law. By placing this singular citation into the context of his entire legal
framework, it becomes evident that Blackstone, despite the formalistic
appearance of his crime definition, did not intend to lose sight of the
material element of the criminal wrong. Not only had he something
material in mind when he spoke of "wrong"'" (the explanation of his
definition) but he also indicated that material element when he stated that
crimes, as "public wrongs," were a breach and violation of the rights and
duties owed to the entire community.22 Even though many questions are
left unanswered by this description of crime,28 one may still recognize a
firm adherence to a material concept of crime which does not find the
criminal wrong solely in the formal breach of the law.
Following Blackstone, the trend toward abstracting the notion of crime
increased. As a natural consequence, the formal elements of crime were
over-stressed at the expense of its material nature. Thus, crime soon came
to be seen only in its formal relation to the law, i.e., the breach of the law.
Among the authors who propounded crime definitions of this variety were
19. See COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF TnE LAWS OF ENGLAND 416 (Thomas ed. 1836).
20. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.

21. Thus, in his general introduction to the "wrongs" (3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIPS
*1-2) he declares that the laws have a material purpose, namely the "establishment of
rights and the prohibition of wrongs."
22. Supra note 20. This material notion is still more clearly expressed by the statement
that "in all cases the crime includes an injury: every public offence is also a private wrong,
and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the community" (id.
at 6).
23. Cf. K
Y, OUmTLNs OF CR1im.x'. LAW 1-20 (15th ed. 1936) who, with good
reason, deplores the ambiguities in Blackstone's definition and tl difficulty of interpreting
the two inconsistent wordings.
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James Fitzjames Stephen,2 4 Wharton, 25 Austin,20 Miller,2 7 and, recently,
Burdick.2 s Typical of these is the short definition of McClain: "A crime
'2 9
is an act or omission punishable as an offense against the state."
It is quite probable that these formalistic concepts of crime born in the
19th Century were a natural offspring of the then predominant legal positivism. Nevertheless, some authors maintained a contrary view, the most
prominent being Henry John Stephen30 and Joel Prentiss Bishop. The
latter demonstrated a very fine insight into the problem of harm. He
emphasized the fact that not every injury resulting from an act was sufficient to make the act indictable, but that such an act had to be "injurious
to the public at large, in distinction from individuals; or else it must be
a wrong to individuals of a nature which the public takes notice of as done
against itself."' Very similar considerations were made by Wingersky 2
Pronouncements on the principle of harm become more definitive as
we approach the 20th Century. We must first view the followers of the
sociological school, such as Gillin and Brasol, for whom crimes were
socially dangerous acts, or acts which violated certain legal rights of
society."3 This school, because of its inherent distrust of legal formalism
24. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1 (1863): "A crime
is an act of disobedience to a law forbidden under pain of punishment." Stephen later
repudiated this definition, holding that only a "description" of what is the subject matter
of criminal law is achievable. There he gives a description of the principal material interests
protected by criminal law; see his 1 ISToRY OF THE C~amniAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1, 3;
cf. also Vol. 2 at 94: when stating the "conditions" under which a man is criminally
responsible, he does not mention the harm requirement.
25. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 16 (12th ed. 1932): Crime is "an act
made punishable by law." There are some changes in subsequent editions.
26. Austin: "Crime is a violation of criminal law"; see SNvER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 8

(1953).

27. MILLER, ON CRIMINAL LAW 16 (1934): Crime is "the commission or omission of an
act which the law forbids or commands under pain of punishment to be imposed by the
state by a proceeding in its own name."
28. BuRmiCK, LAW OF CRIMES § 70 (1946): Crime is the "commission . . . of any act,

in violation of a public law either prohibiting or commanding it, and which is punishable
by the offended government .... "
29. McCLAIm, CRIMINAL LAW § 4 (1897).
30. STEPHEN, 4 NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 77 (4th ed. 1858): "A

crime is a violation of a right; when considered in reference to the evil tendency of such
violation, as regards the community at large."
31. BisHop, 1 COMM IENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 232 (5th ed. 1872); cf. also
§§ 32,230-31.
32. CLARK & MARSHALL, ON THE LAW OF CRIMEUS 14-15, 79, 89 (6th ed. by Wingersky,

1958) [hereinafter cited as CLARK & MARsHALL].
33. BRASOL, THE ELEMENT OF CRWE 30 (1931). Similar, though not originating in the
sociological school, are the results of those who would punish not for the harm done in a
crime but for the dangerousness the perpetrator has evidenced by his harmful behavior;
Cf. Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, 11 Wis. L. REv. 346, 368
(1935/36); Mackay, Some Reflections on the New Canadian Criminal Code, 12 ToRONTO
U.L.J. 206, 209-10 (1957/58).
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and its sociological comprehension of the law, inevitably reached a
material concept of crime. This, however, need not be true of representafives of the classical common law tradition. And yet, they too, by also
considering the basis of criminal liability, arrived at a position which
recognized harm as an element of crime. 4 The shortest and most precise
by Perkins-"any social harm defined and
definition of this sort was given
35
made punishable by law."
Even greater support for the requirement of harm is provided by those
scholars who, though remaining within the common law tradition, attempted a definition of crime on a more theoretical-philosophical basis.
In their view, the general nature of crime could be conceptualized by
means of several general principles, including among them the principle
of harm. Here, the harm requirement naturally receives its most significant
endorsement, since, thus founded, it was not only an incidental but an
essential part of the crime. Thus, harm was placed in the context of a
higher order, i.e., as one of the fundamental principles of criminal liability.
Among the authors who share this view, particular mention should be
made of Jerome Hall, 36 Gerhard 0. W. Mueller 3 7 and Orvill C. Snyder."
In terms of his seven general principles (a union of formal and material
elements), Hall defines crime as "legally forbidden (voluntary) conduct
which (teleologically) causes a proscribed harm, for which the offender
is subjected to a punitive sanction." 39
When we speak of the presence of the harm requirement in the American law, we must recognize a doctrine which actually grew out of constitutional rather than criminal considerations, but which is, nevertheless,
an immensely significant aspect of the harm problem: the so-called utility
principle. In a recent publication,4 ° Professor Scott convincingly demonstrated that it is of vital importance to have a device which would effectively restrain over-anxious lawmakers from exceeding constitutional
limits, particularly in the face of a steadily increasing number of poorly
considered, indiligent products of penal legislation. Since many such
statutes are not always in clear violation of some constitutional provision,
the traditional arguments for declaring them invalid are not satisfactory.
34. Cf. Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1934/35), who
holds punishment justified only upon proof "that an act has been done which by reason
of its harmful results or tendencies should be repressed by criminal punishment." Also
KENY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 5, considers harm one of the three elements characteristic
of a crime. Cf. also DANGLE, CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1951) ; State v. Western Union, supra note 1.
35. PERxIS, CRIMINAL LAW 8 (1957).
36. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 18 and 212-246.
37. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1052, 1066 (1958).
38. SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION INTO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 112, 759 (1953).
39. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 225 n.47.
40. Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 275, 280-83 (1957).

1965-1966]

"HARM"IN CONCEPT OF CRIME

Fortunately, however, there are a growing number of courts which, on
one theory or another, summon the courage to nullify legislative products
which are excessively unreasonable or useless.
This is, of course, not the place to decide whether the utility principle,
upon which the unconstitutionality of many unreasonable prohibitions is
actually based, can be included within the concept of crime. Doubts were
raised by Mueller when discussing this question in a review of Hall's
General Principles," but this view is too pessimistic. In dealing with the
value aspect of the legal interests (infra III), we shall see that the utility
requirement is in fact a part of the constitutional foundation of criminally
protected interests and, as such, an integral part of their structure. Here,
it is sufficient to note that the present evolution of the utility idea is but
another symptom of the growing recognition and significance given to the
principle of harm within the common law.
Most penal codes of the so-called civil law countries contain no material
definition of the crime or, if at all, usually define crime in a rather formal
way-as an illegal and culpable act or omission made punishable by law."
This fact, which at first glance might seem to indicate a disregard of the
harm requirement, should not be given undue weight, since gaps in the
penal code usually are filled by the courts with rules and propositions
developed by distinguished jurists. Therefore, if we wish to determine the
views of the harm requirement held by the civil law systems, we must look
to the opinions of the authoritative schools and scholars on these matters.
Within the reach of the civil law, we can observe some distinctive differences between the systems of Romanic derivation and those of Germanic origin. The Romanic countries in general demonstrate a more formal, logical approach toward the problem of harm, excluding, of course,
the followers of the sociological school and the social defense movement.43
In French criminal theory, for example, the crime ('infraction) is composed of three elements: (a) 6l9ment legal, (b) jl~ment matgrijl, (c)
ilMment moral.14 At first glance, it might seem that the 6l6ment matirijl
contains our definition of the harm requirement; however, it does not,
for while the 619ment ldgal embodies the principle of legality and the
jlMment moral that of culpability (mens rea)," the 6liment matdridl re41. Mueller, supra note 3, at 224-5.

42. "Crime is any illegal act imputable to the perpetrator and made punishable by law."
GREEX PENAL CoDE art. 14 (1950). Even briefer is this: Crime is "any voluntary act or
omission subject to punishment by law." CHmENLAN CODE art. 1 (1875). As to the similarity
of the Japanese definition ef. SAiTO, DAS jAPANISCHE STRAFRcHT, in MEZGER-SCH5NKXEJEscHEcK, DAS AUSLANDISCME STRAFRECHT DER GE ENWART 209, 227 ('1955).
43. Cf. Ferri, The Reform of Penal Law in Italy, J. CRim. L., CP.M. & P.S. 178

(1921/22).
44. See Pierre Bouzat, Traitd thgoretique et pratique de droit pinal, No. 64 (1951).
45. Id. at Nos. 65, 103.
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lates only to the external facet of the crime, i.e., the question of whether
the prohibited conduct is shown by an external commission or omission. 6
The problem of the external result is thus raised but, as we shall see later,
this phenomenon is different from that of harm. Yet, even though the
French definition of crime does not expressly include a recognition of
the harm requirement, the theory does not completely circumscribe the
principle. In addition to the formal crime definition, French theory presents a material description of crime in its substantive sense. Thus, Bouzat
"describes" crime as "an act or omission which manifests itself externally
as an attack upon the social order, peace and tranquility, and which the
law, for that reason, sanctions with punishment." 7
A similar differentiation between a formal definition and a material
description of the crime is made by the Italians. However, Italian scholars
are divided into two schools4" with reference to the formal elements of
the crime; there is still less agreement as to the substantive nature of the
wrong. In the 1860's, Carrara had given a very positivistic description of
the crime as the "violation of the state, resulting from an external act of
a human being which is neither justified by the accomplishment of a duty
'49
nor by the exercise of a right and which is threatened with a penalty.
In spite of the great effort made by the sociological school and the strong
influence coming from German criminal theory, the Italian classical school
is still skeptical of any integration of the harm element into the crime
definition.5" Even the notion of material unlawfulness as promulgated by
Franz von Liszt is still rejected by some. 5
Other criminal theories in which the notion of material unlawfulness
52
as harm to legal interests is expressly denied include those of Greece,
46. Id. at No. 97: "L'4lment mat&rikl, c'est la fait exterieur par lequel l'infraction se
r~vle et, pour ainsi dire, prends corps."
47. Id. at No. 57.
48. The traditional school divides the crime into two parts, an objective and a subjective element, the first being concerned with the question of criminal conduct, the latter
with the problem of guilt. Followers: Manzini, Florian, Ranieri; for more details see
AsrroIsx, MANUALE Di DnuTo PENALE, PART GENERA E 147 (1957). The other school,
following the German theory, makes a threefold division into act, unlawfulness
PENALE 140 (2d ed. 1950); also Delitala,
(antigiuridicitA) and guilt. So BETTIOL, Drro
Maggiore, Petricelli; cf. ANTOmSEI, supra at 144-5.
49. CARRARA, PROGRAMMA DEL CORSO DI DnITro CRIMINALE, PARTE GENERALE §§ 21
et seq. (1863).
50. Ci. BETTIOL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 133. But for the rest Bettiol is a firm supporter of the idea of material unlawfulness; cf. id. at 193: "Un' antigiuridiciti senza contenuto non ha alcuna ragione di esistere" (An unlawfulness without contents-substancedoes not have any reason to exist).
51. E.g. ANTOLISE1, op. cit. supra note 48, at 137. Contra BETrioa, cf. his statement
supra note 50.
52. Cf. MANGAKIS, DAs GR-cmscE STAFECHT, in 3 MEZGER-SCH6NKE-JSCHECK,
op. cit.
supra note 42, at 255, 281. Here the substance of crime is not related to a material
harm but exclusively to the violation of the legal norm.
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Japan, 53 and Argentina. 4 Like the Italians, they are content with the
element of formal unlawfulness as it is manifested in the "typicita"
(typicalness) of the act,5 and the absence of any justification.
Here, as well, the need for a concept of material unlawfulness becomes
urgent when questions of attempt and justification are considered for
resolution. Thus, for example, it is impossible to ascertain the crucial
borderline between preparation and attempt without reference to the legal
interests involved. With reference to Greek law, Mangakis5 6 has recognized that the problem of necessity requires the comparison of the legal
interests of the injured on the one side and those of the perpetrator acting
in an emergency situation on the other.
Contrary to the systems just presented, the idea of material unlawfulness is commonly recognized in the Germanic countries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland). Rittler, in the Austrian criminal law system, emphasizes that the formal breach of the law gains its deeper sense solely by
reference to the legal interests which are harmed by the formally unlawful
act.57 Vital Schwander, a Swiss criminal law scholar, also recognizes
material unlawfulness as the endangering or destruction of legal goods
or legally protected interests. He further stresses that in the final analysis
formal and material unlawfulness are coincident with each other. 8
These conceptions of material unlawfulness and the material concept
of crime were shaped to a large extent by the influence of German criminal
jurisprudence. Thus, it is worthwhile and necessary to trace the development within the German theory more explicitly, in particular with regard
to its notion of "Rechtsgut" which still seems to be the most refined concept of the legal interests and, thus, of criminal harm.
We can retrace the present doctrines of harm and material unlawfulness
in the German material concept of crime5 9 to Paul Johann von Feuerbach
53. Cf. SATro, op. cit. supra note 42, at 234. Here, too, material unlawfulness is narrowly
restricted to what is formally prohibited by law.
54. The Argentine criminal theory still uses the concept of unlawfulness in the sense of a
formalistic rule-exception relationship as developed by Von Beling; see NUNEz, DAS ARGENTnIscnx STRAFRPCXT, in 3 MFZGER-SCH65XNK-JESCHECK, op. cit. supra note 42, at 11, 23.
55. I.e., the fulfillment of the typical elements and circumstances of the statutory crime
definition.
56. MANGAxiS, op. cit. supra note 52, at 290.
57. THEODOR RrTTLER, 1 LEHRBUCH DES 5STERREICHISCHEN STRAFREc:tTs
1954).

Similar

FRIEDRICH

NowAKOWSKI,

DAS

6STaERRICHSCHE

STRAFRECHT

116 (2d ed.
IN

SEINEN

GRUNDZUGEN 51-53 passim (1955).
58. VrrAL SCHWANDER, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE STRAFGESETZBtucH 61 (1952). But cf. also
ERNST -AFTER, LENRBUCH DES SCHWIzERISCHEN STRAFREUNTS, ALLEMESiER TEmL 93-4

(1946).
59. To the following see ROBERT vON HIPPEL, 1 DEuTscHnS SmAFRECUT 19, 17 (1925);
E.RNsT HEn Tz, DAS PROBLEM DE MATERIELLEN RECHTSWmRiGKErT (1926); RICHARD M.
DES VERLETZTEN (1919).
HoNir, DIE EINWILLIGUNO
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(1775-1833), the father of modern German criminal jurisprudence. Based
on early liberal ideas of natural rights which obtain legal protection by a
social contract between the state and its citizens, Feuerbach believed that
any attack against the state by breach of its laws is also a violation of
the individual rights the state seeks to protect. Thus, for Feuerbach,
crime is a violation of the rights of the state or of an individual.6" This
definition, however, soon proved itself to be too narrow and ambiguous.
What was meant by "right?" Right in an objective or subjective sense?
What is the relationship of legal values which cannot be classified as
rights? Out of the controversy which then developed, two lines of thought
emerged-one leading to the essentially formal unlawfulness of Binding,
the other to the material unlawfulness of Franz von Liszt.
The theory of formal unlawfulness had a rather complex development.
From the historical school of the early 19th Century and from the theocratic legal philosophy of Julius Stahl, a movement came into existence
which strictly rejected any rights outside of, or paramount to, those of
the state. In contradiction to the natural law theory of a "social contract,"
the state was not thought to be the sole basis of individual rights and
interests. 1 The logical consequence of this premise was that the crime
was not wholly the violation of an individual right, but rather an endangering of the state by breach of a public law.
This development was further extended by Karl Binding. Although he
recognized and even advanced the "Rechtsgut" idea (legal good), he did
not employ it for the determination of the substance of crime because he
felt that its value and significance were restricted to purposes of law
making. In his crime concept, he used a purely logic-positivistic approach
based on his theory of the "norms." Since all legal rights and interests
were deemed to be protected by embodiment in corresponding norms of
the state, they necessarily were absorbed by the norms, thereby losing
their significance in the material substance of the crime. Since a norm of
the state demands obedience from the citizens to whom it is addressed,
the breach of the norm is disobedience to the state, which grants the state
a right to punish. 2 Therefore, for Binding, the substance of the criminal
wrong does not consist in the impairment of certain interests or rights,
but in the disobedience of a norm, i.e., a command of the state. Since this
disobedience is common to all crimes, it is, in essence, no more than a
purely formal unlawfulness.
The development of the concept of material unlawfulness took yet
another course. After Feuerbach had defined crime as violation of a private or state "right," it became evident that all those traditional offenses;
60. See v. HIPPEL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 296-7.
61. Cf. HoNiG, op. cit. supra note 59, at 46.
62. See KARL BiNrviN,

1 HANDBUCH DES STRAFRECETS 181, 503 (1885).
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the objectives of which could not be called a "right" in its precise sense
(e.g., rape, bankruptcy, etc.), would have to be excluded from the concept of crime.6" This concept was, of course, unsatisfactory. Finally, Karl
Birnbaum replaced Feuerbach's "right" by his own concept of
"Rechtsgut" (legal good); this suggestion received almost general acclaim. Crime now was considered to be the "violation or endangerment
of a good equally guaranteed to all by the power of the state."6 4 After
lengthy debate over the elements of the "Rechtsgut," it became generally
defined as a "legally protected interest."6 5 Although there are various
definitions of "Rechtsgut," its basic concept has surely become a principal
notion of modern German criminal thinking.66
From this position it was not a great step to the development of the
concept of material unlawfulness and thus to the material concept of
crime. A major stride towards this concept was taken by Franz von Liszt
when he declared that the attack upon legally protected interests was
unlawful as such, and that beyond this there was no need for the special
prohibition by the legal order. As von Liszt said, "the concept of
Recktsgut necessarily includes the prohibition of any interference."6 " Thus,
the substance of the crime was no longer the formal breach of the law but
rather the injury to legally protected interests.
Unfortunately, the progress of this development was not fully realized
because of the argument over the relationship between formal and material
unlawfulness and their final separation.6" Therefore, the normativesystematic combination and integration of both into one concept of criminal unlawfulness was impeded. The result was that formal unlawfulness,
as an easily perceivable concept, is now part of every crime definition,
while material unlawfulness is not yet incorporated into a comprehensive
63. So in fact Feuerbach's own conclusion that incest, rape, bankruptcy, self-mutilation
are to be punished, but only as non-criminal offences since they are not directed against a
"right." See v. HiPPEL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 297 with n.4.
64. BRNBAum, 15 ARCHLv YiR CRim:INALRECHT 149, 179 (1834).
65. v. LISZT, LEHERBUCH DES DEUTSCHE N STRAFRECHTs 8 (4th ed. 1891). About the
development in particular see HoNIG, op. cit. supra note 59, at 60-76 and his criticism at
83-112.
66. See MAURACH, DEuTscHEs STRAEREcHT, ALLGFMINER TEm 168 (2d ed. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as MAUP.AC]. In recent decades, however, the "Rechtsgut" as focus of
the material wrong of crime was challenged by two movements, one coming from the
so-called Kiel-School (Dahm, Schaffstein, Gallas) which, under Nazi influence, saw the
criminal wrong less in an injury to certain protectable interests but more in the violation
of duties owed to the state. The other movement, as an extreme consequence of Welzel's
finalistic theory of conduct, puts the main emphasis on the subjective personal disvalue of
the act rather than on the harm done to objective interest. But in this, Welzel stands almost
alone: See infra II.
67. V. LISZT, op. cit. supra note 65, at 145.
68. For details see Nagler, Der Begriff der Rechtswidrigkeit, in 1 FESTGABE Fpa FRANx
339 (1930).
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concept of crime. Nonetheless, material unlawfulness as an expression
of the harm requirement is certainly recognized in its particular importance for the motivation of
criminal legislation and the explanation of
69
other aspects of the crime.

A special presentation of the socialist school of the criminal law is essential since it maintains precisely the opposite extreme of a one-sided material
concept of crime. 70 Here, the harm caused by "socially dangerous acts"
stands in the center of the crime concept. It is not the formal fulfillment
of a clearly defined and legally determined prohibition which makes the
perpetrator criminally liable; it is instead the perpetration of a socially
dangerous act manifested by the destruction of, or jeopardy to, interests
which the socialist state desires to protect.
Although a discussion of the development of Soviet criminal law requires more detailed analysis, we cannot disregard it completely; without
it the socialist crime concept will hardly be understood. Following the
complete breakdown of the Tsaristic law, Soviet criminal law soon was
recognized as an important part of the socialist revolution. Contrary to
the ideas of western liberalism, this new law was not primarily a safeguard
of the individual against abuse by the state, but was a tool of the state
for establishing its socialist order. For that reason, the old principles of
"nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege" were no longer feasible since they
would bind the government's hands in suppressing anti-revolutionary
individuals and groups.
This new understanding of law as a function of the state71 was the
occasion for a basic change in the concept of crime. At the very outset,
the first "Principles for the Criminal Law of 19191,72 obliterated all clear
definitions of crimes. Instead, in one general clause, the "Principles" provided that a crime was "any act dangerous to the Soviet system." To fill
the cup of insecurity to the brim, such socially dangerous acts were to be
judged according to the "revolutionary conscience of justice. 7
Cf. MAURACH, op. cit. supra note 66, at 168-180; MEZOER, STCAFPECUT 197-204
1933).
This material character of the Soviet crime concept is always praised as an advancecomparison to the formal concept of the "bourgois" criminal law; see ROGINSKII
AND KARNITSKII, UGoLNVI KoDExs R.S.F.S.R. 3 (1936). English translation in HAZARD &

69.
(2d ed.
70.
-ment in

WEISBERT, CASES AND READINGS ON SOVIET LAW 43 (1950). To Soviet criminal law in general

see: Hazard, Reforming Soviet Criminal Law, 29 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 157 (1938);
Hazard, Trend of Law in the USSR, Wis. L. REV. 223 (1947); Berman, Principles of Soviet
Criminal Law, 56 YALE L.J. 805 (1947); MAURAC, SYSTEM DES RusSISCEN STRAFRECEITS
(1928).
71. See Decree on Basic Principles for the Criminal Law of the R.S.F.S.R. of Dec. 12,
1919, in HAZARD & WEISBERG, op. cit. supra note 70, at 2.
72. Ibid.
73. See MAurAcH, DAS REcrsSssmM DER USSR 18 (1953).
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After a short period of greater security to the Soviet subjects in the
Penal Code of 1922, a new, but more severe codification was promulgated
in 1926 which remained in effect until 1958." 4 Here we can clearly recognize the four main features of the socialist concept of crime.
Contrary to the liberal attitude of non-socialist penal laws which protect both the interests of the individual and the state, Soviet penal law
enunciates a clear preference for the interests of the socialist state and
society. This is frankly expressed in art. 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Penal Code
of 1926, which designates "the socialist state of workers and peasants
and the established order therein" as the sole object of criminal protection.
The same object of protection also appears in the crime definition of
art. 6 of the Penal Code. Perhaps it is a mistake even to speak of "crime"
since the Code uses only the term "socially dangerous acts." Socially
dangerous, however, refers to any act "which is directed against the Soviet
regime, or which violates the order of things established by the workers'
and peasants' authority for the period of transition to a Communist
regime." The peculiarity of this crime definition is that it is related not
to the breach of certain legal rules, but rather directly to the interests to
be protected. Thus, in order to prove a crime, it is not sufficient to show
the breach of a law, but rather a damage to the interests enumerated in
that article of the Code.
This predominance of the material element can be made more evident
by the use of analogy. If the substance of crime is not ultimately determined by the breach of a law, the question arises as to whether it is at
all necessary to make punishment dependent upon the proof of the breach
of the law, provided the act in question is in fact socially dangerous. To
deny the requirement of the breach of a specific prohibition naturally
means to allow analogy; it was thus permitted by Soviet law. On these
grounds, art. 16 of the Code provided that socially dangerous acts, even
if not expressly dealt with by the Code, may be sanctioned according to
the criminal provision most closely applicable. It is but the perfection of
this concept that an act, socially dangerous according to the Code, may
not be penalized if "by the time it comes up for investigation or trial it
has lost its socially dangerous character" or if the perpetrator "cannot
now in the opinion of the court be considered socially dangerous" (art. 8).
Thus, if the substance of the crime does not consist of the breach of the
law but of a dangerous, anti-social act, it is only logical that an act,
although within the meaning of the Penal Code, is no longer a crime
when no longer "dangerous" to the socialist society.
In 1959, however, a fundamental reform of the Soviet penal law was
commenced by four legislative acts of the federal government. The most
74. An English translation of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. of 1926 was published
by the British Foreign Office (H.M. Stationary Office, London 1934).
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important was the "Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation,"75 which
brought a number of significant changes, most of them favorable to the
Soviet subjects.7" The material concept of crime, however, was preserved.
This is true even in spite of the fact that analogy was abolished,7 7 for the
substance of crime remains the socially dangerous act. This not only
follows from sec. 7(1) of the new Principles, which still defines crime as
a socially dangerous act, but more specifically from the principle recognized anew in sec. 7(2) that an act, although contained in the legal definition of a crime, will not be considered a crime, "if owing to its insignificance it is not socially dangerous."7
The material concept of crime was also adopted by many other socialist
countries. Among the first to do so was Yugoslavia in its Penal Code of
1947. 7' Although art. 4 of the Yugoslav Penal Code defines crime as "a
socially dangerous act the elements of which are defined by law,"" ° which
thus adheres to the principle of legality and excludes analogy, the material
substance of the crime is based not so much on the breach of the legal
provision as on the social "dangerousness" of the perpetrator. This conclusion flows from the provision, similar to that in the Soviet "Principles,"
that an act, although fulfilling the definitional elements of a crime, is not
punishable if at the time of the judgment it cannot be considered a danger
to society (art. 4). This rule can only be understood in connection with
the proposition that the criminal offense deserving of punishment must be
more than a formal breach of the law. In Donnelly's words, "behavior
75. English translation in SznMtAI, 3 LAW TN EASTERN EUROPE 34-151 (Leyden 1959).

Since the USSR is a federal union in which the union republics have jurisdiction over
criminal matters, the new "Principles" are theoretically not in force prior to their enactment by the union republics. But as a matter of practice, they are of immediate influence on

the whole Soviet criminal legislation.
76. E.g., the resurrection of the requirement of guilt which had been abolished in 1926
(see sec. 3); the abolition of analogy (sec. 3); the extension of the objects of criminal

protection to individual rights and interest; the reintroduction of the terms of "penalty"
and "punishment," instead of "measures of social defense." For more details see Grzybowski,
Main Trends in the Soviet Reform of Criminal Law, 9 A.m.
BEMMELEN, INTRODUCTION TO SZIRAI, op. cit. supra note 75.

U.L. Rav. 93 (1960);

VAN

Very informative also is the recent report by F. J. Feldbrugge, Soviet Criminal LawThe Last Six Years, 54 J. CRat. L., C. & P.S. 249-266 (1963) who also concludes that in
recent years Soviet criminal law has shown a rapid development in a generally favorable
direction.
77. See sec. 3 (grounds for criminal responsibility) which reads: "Only a person who is

guilty of the commission of a crime, i.e., a socially dangerous act, committed intentionally,
and forbidden by law (!), bears criminal responsibility."
78. As to the practical handling of cases in which at the time of the trial the illegal
act was no longer socially dangerous see MAURACH, Aus DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DER SOWJETISCHEN GERICHTE ZUm ALLEGmEINEN TEIL DES STRAFRECHTS, 4 JAHRBUCH FUR OSTRECIUT

66

(1963).

79. Cf. Donelly, The New Yugoslavian Code, 61 YALE L.J. 510 (1952); MUNDA, DAS
STRAFRECHT JuGOSLAwiEws, in 1 MEZGER-SC116NKE-JESCHEcx, op. cit. supra note 42, at 369.
80. See Donelly, supra note 79, at 512.
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must constitute a danger to the social order which the criminal law was
designed to protect and to foster.""s
The Czechoslovak criminal code of 1950 is essentially the same as those
of the USSR and of Yugoslavia. It is more advanced, however, in that it
attempts to adapt the traditional systematic structure of the classicalliberal crime concept to its new material substance. As a reaction against
the "bourgeois" crime concept of the past, the term "unlawfulness" was
replaced by "social dangerousness." Whereas formerly the fulfillment of
the definitional elements of the crime demonstrated the unlawfulness of
the act, it is now interpreted as an indication of "social dangerousness."
The first task of the Czechoslovakian judge is not to find the formal fulfillment of the definitional elements of a crime, but to examine the act to
determine whether it is socially dangerous. Only if these elements are
present may he find the violation of a legal prohibition. 2
We shall conclude our survey on the socialist concept of crime with a
brief comment on the peculiar situation existing in Eastern Germany.
Although the "bourgeois" imperial penal code of 1871 is still in force, the
old element of "Rechtswidrigkeit" (unlawfulness) is still preserved; social
dangerousness is now said to be the fundamental substance of the crime.
formally illegal, is not a crime if it lacks
Consequently, an act, though
"social dangerousness.""8 This change necessitated the creation of the
rule that an act is not illegal if its "social dangerousness" is insignificant.8 4
Conclusion: A Material Crime Definition
This survey of the various criminal concepts demonstrates that in one
way or another the requirement of harm is almost universally recognized
as a material element of criminal law. Whether the principle of harm is
considered only as a factor of criminal policy (as in most non-socialist
criminal theories) or whether harm in the sense of "social dangerousness"
is made the real and decisive substance of the crime (as in socialist
theories), there is at least universal agreement that society and government may not justly penalize human activities as long as they are not
harmful in fact. 5
If, however, the harm requirement is a basic principle of criminal law
and an essential element of any crime, it would seem necessary that it be
81. Id. at 513.
82. Cf. ScnmiED, DAS TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHE SmAFREcnT, in 2 MEZGER-SCHiNKEJEscHEcK, op. cit. supra note 42, at 359, 409.
83. See LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK, ALLGEM INER TEIL 265, 490 (Gerats-Lekschas-Renneberg eds. 1959).
84. See §§ 158, 164, 221 CR IMNAL PROCEDURE CODE of Oct. 2, 1952. See to this GeratsLekschas-Renneberg, op. cit. supra note 83, at 492.
85. § 153 of the GERMAN CRIMINVIAL PROCEDURE CODE Of 1877 reads: "Offences are not
prosecuted if the guilt of the perpetrator is small and the consequences of the act are
insignificant, provided the procurement of a judicial decision is not in the public interest."
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integrated into and expressed by the definition of the crime. Thus, we must
reject all theories which make a distinction between a formal crime
"definition" and a material crime "description." To make this distinction
is a useless, if not confusing, doubling of notions, also ontologically incorrect. Only if one follows a pure theory of law, such as Hans Kelsen's,8"
is it possible to make such a distinction between the legal form and the
sociological substance. We must, after a dangerous period of idealistic
legal positivism, carefully examine all attempts to "free" legal formalism
from the sociological facts. This is particularly important in penal law,
which deals with a human perpetrator. If we attempt to comprehend an
act with exclusively formal concepts, we run the risk of neglecting essential parts of the human personality which cannot be separated from the
material substance of the criminal act. This is precisely the reason why
we must include the harm element in the crime concept: it gives the formal
breach of the law its social significance and the color of life.
Using these considerations and the suggestion of Jerome Hall, we can
define crime as legally forbidden conduct which causes a proscribed harm,
for whose perpetration the offender, provided he acted with mens rea, is
subjected to a punitive sanction.8 7
II. THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL HARM
The objective of the first chapter was simply to circumscribe the position which the harm requirement occupies within the concept of crime.
We concluded that it is a part of the criminal wrong, and that, in fact, it
is the true material substance of the criminal wrong. As such, it must not
be confused with the breach of the law, which is only the formal unlawfulness of the criminal wrong.
Since we are dealing with the principle of harm in general rather than
with the harm of a specific crime, we must seek a definition of the harm
element which is broad enough to comprehend all of the various types of
criminal harm, i.e., murder, forgery, or driving without a license. The
outcome, in turn, will be a definition of harm which logically reflects the
main features of the harm, namely, those elements which must be present
in all types of criminal harm. 8
Yet the problem of finding so general a proposition is hardly a matter
of experimental analysis alone. Certainly one could compare the harms
of various crimes and establish as elements of harm those factors common
86. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY Op LAW AND STATE, 391-446 (1949); cf. also W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL TiEORY 112-125 (3d ed. 1953).
87. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 225 n.47. Hall's definition was to supplement the requirement
of mens rea.
88. J. HALL, LEGAL CLASSIFICATION, in STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL SCIENCE
150 (1958), is skeptical, too, if aside from the description of harm in certain legal sanctions
we can define harm otherwise than in general terms.
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to all, arriving at a theorization or generalization of the legislative purposes of those crimes. Our task is more a pre-legislative one. Since jurisprudence is not confined to mere commentarial interpretation of what the
legislature has produced but involves also the task of providing new
devices and propositions for the advancement of law and justice, we must
not be content with what the legislators thought the essence of criminal
harm to be. It is, rather, a permanent obligation of criminal jurisprudence
to refine the principles of criminal liability, which, in turn; the legislators
may then use to orient themselves when defining new crimes. In this sense
we are trying to find the principal elements of which any type of criminal
harm must be composed.
The first step in our investigation will be to distinguish harm as the
objective material wrong of the crime from the subjective personal immorality of the offender. A short review of the more important objective
harm theories which can be found in American criminal jurisprudence
will follow. From there, we will proceed to a tentative determination of
the nature of criminal harm.
Harm and Ethics
A crime, the voluntary act of a human being, in any case is a formal
breach of the law. Beyond this, it not only causes a detrimental change in
the outside world, but it also involves a subjective personal wrong of the
perpetrator who, because he is a human being and, therefore, an ethical
personality, simultaneously commits an offense against the moral values
and maxims by which he is bound. Since, as demonstrated in the foregoing
chapter, the essence of harm cannot be seen in the formal breach of the
law, the question remains whether harm may consist in the personal
immoral wrong of the offender or, alternatively, in the impairment of
some objective right, interest, or external good. We shall attempt to establish a proposition which would regard the subjective personal immorality
of the perpetrator as the essence of harm; thus, as the basis of criminal
liability, it would clearly be inconsistent with sound common law tradition
and repugnant to the spirit of the constitution.
It is true that in the early days of criminal law, moral and penal liability
were perhaps too closely connected, as evidenced by the form and attitude
of the statutes of that time. 9 This was, however, only an intermediate
station in a process which had its origin in a religious understanding of
law and state, furthered by the complex relationships between church and
state at that time. As the independent, secular function of the state became more clearly recognized, criminal law retreated from dealing with
wrongs concerned solely with moral and religious life which were more
properly within the jurisdiction of the church. Since that time, criminal
89. HOuSWORTH, 2 HSTORY Op ENcLuI

LAW 50 (3d ed. 1927).
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liability has been, in principle, confined to wrongs which result in an
external injury. This result was exemplified in the first truly public
crimes such as the crimina laesae maiestatis, which were punished not
because the moral peace of the perpetrator's soul was disturbed, but only
because the external public security and order were endangered. 90
The crimes derived from former tort actions are even stronger proof
of the fact that the criminal sanction was dependent on the offender's
interference with an external situation, either by trespassing on another's
property or by endangering another's reputation. In all such cases there
was more than a subjective moral fault on the part of the perpetrator;
there was also objective damage to the victim. This is true, as Mr. Justice
Holmes has shown, in spite of the fact that "the law of torts abounds in
moral phraseology.""
It likewise appears from the constitutional position of the State that
harm must consist of more than the immorality of the act. Since the
State is not a moralistic institution, but protects its citizens from unlawful
interference with their rights and interests, government would transgress
the inherent limitations of its power if it attempted to correct the internal
faults of its subjects rather than limiting its goals to the prevention of
injury to their lives, liberties or property interests. For this reason, mere
disobedience of the law, which is a personal wrong rather than an external
harm, would hardly be a sufficient justification to subject the disobedient
citizen to criminal sanction. This principle of preventing the state from
involvement in the moral life of its subjects was briefly but precisely
expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes' famous statement in Commonwealth
v. Kennedy: "The aim of the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent
certain external results." 92 A similar view was stated by Glanville Williams:
"criminal law is generally concerned to. repress conducts hurtful to
90. At first sight, this statement may seem inconsistent with the interesting observation
made by RIcHARD M. HONIG, DAS AaMERIXANISCaE STRAFRECHT, in MEZGER-ScriSNKEJEscHECK, 4 DAS AUSLIDISCHE STRARECHT DER GEGENWART 45-46 (1962) that American
criminal theory and practice still keeps to the old distinction between mala in se (crimes
which are "against good morals") and mere mala prohibita (offenses against the interests
of the state and the welfare of the society) as well as with the fact that in sexual offenses,
since they are considered inherently immoral, the defendant hardly may be discharged for
mistake of fact (op. cit. supra, at 126-128). But actually these peculiarities do not affect
our proposition that the offender's immorality as such is not the basis of penal liability,
for the concept of a crime malum in se does not necessarily imply that the moral wrong
be the only wrong the perpetrator is punished for. The immorality of the crime malum in se
is, beside the external harmful effects it produces, merely an additional distinctive characteristic of such a crime. And as far as mistakes of fact in sexual offenses are concerned, this is
simply a question of mens rea and personal imputability that does not pertain to the essence
of the criminal wrong.
91. HOLmES, THE COMMON LAW 79; cf. also Morris R. Cohen, On Absolutism in Legal
Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 681, 686-87 (1936).
92. 170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N.E. 770 (1897).
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society."" a It was only a difference in emphasis when Michael & Wechsler" *
declared that the end of criminal law is to control socially undesirable
behavior, for the very purpose of that end is "to promote the common
good." The Model Penal Code also expresses a purpose of the criminal
law to be the forbidding and preventing of conduct "that unjustifiably and
unexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual and public
interests."95 Many similar statements could be added. 6 All support the
fundamental principle that it is not the subjective ethical immorality of
the offender, but the damage done to objective interests and values which
is the true substance of criminal harm. Thus understood, the harm requirement is precisely the principle which, if properly employed, would restrain
the state from punishing purely immoral wrongs.
To ascertain a complete picture of the opinions on this matter we must
also note that there are a number of criminal theories which are not
reconcilable with our proposition of an objective harm. 7 This reference is
not to Hall's so-called moralistic conception of mens rea which does not
sufficiently take into account the basic changes in the sociological basis
of the public morality of this technical age.9 But, as Hall himself has
often stated, mens rea, though the "ultimate summation of the moral
judgments,"9 9 is not the only basis of criminal liability. Harm is as important as mens rea. Furthermore, the moral judgment of mens rea is not
the expression of some subjective ethical code but a code as "expressed
in the proscription of the voluntary (intentional or reckless) commission
of numerous social harms." 00
Quite a contrary view, however, is taken by Hans Welzel, the primary
originator of the so-called finalistic theory of the act (finale Handlungs93. WILLIAMS, CRIMDINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 17 (2d ed. 1961).
94. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 9-10 (1940).
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
96. Cf. CLARx & MARSHALL, ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 81 (6th rev. ed. Wingersky 1958):
Criminal law does not punish a man for his acts merely because they are immoral. There
must be something more than this, e.g., a common nuisance such as public immorality or

indecency. A very interesting symposium on the relationship of ethical values and law in
general is published in 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 1-68 (1951): Ethical Values and the Law in Action,

with contributions by Cohen, Brown, Hartman, Jenkins, and Smith. See also Paul D. Carrington, The Moral Quality of the Criminal Law, 54 Nw. U.L. R~v. 575 (1959).
97. Cowan, A Critique of the Moralistic Conception of CriminalLaw, 97 U. PA. L. REv.
502 (1948/49)

who sharply criticizes Hall's proposition that penal liability is founded on

moral consciousness of the guilt, and that mens rea is to be regarded as evil or conscienceless
behaviour.
98. In face of these changes G. 0. W. Mueller's suggestion to differentiate the substance

of mens rea as to cultural criminal law (requiring knowledge of the evil nature of the act)
and as to regulatory criminal law (requiring knowledge of unlawfulness) is the only logical
way out. See Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MnNu. L. REv. 1043, 1057-61, 1066
(1958).
99. GENERAL PRnCrPLES 146.
100. Ibid.; see also id. at 104.
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lehre). For Welzel, the primary function of criminal law is the promotion
of the elementary social-ethical act values and, only secondarily, the
protection of various legal interests.'' The logical consequence is that the
criminal wrong is said to consist in the personal disutility, i.e., an impairment of some legal interest, and is significant only in so far as a supplement to the personal wrong. This means that objective harm can be missing without affecting the personal disutility of the act, and, thus, without
affecting the essence of the criminal wrong. 2
This, indeed, shows a very dangerous trend towards a penal law which
concerns itself more with the morality of its citizens than with the protection of the common good. Welzel certainly is correct in reasoning that
interests are best protected if citizens are morally stable. However, the
question of whether to prevent social harm by preserving certain moral
standards is not merely an issue of efficiency; it also involves the constitutional concern for moral freedom. The right of citizens to freedom of
conscience simply forbids the government to direct the morals of its
subjects.
For this reason or another, Welzel's theory has few followers.' To the
contrary, his ideas have been vigorously assailed by Thomas Wiirtenberger.10 4 Even so distinguished a supporter of Welzel's finalistic doctrine
of the act as Reinhart Maurach does not approve of Welzel's idea of
making the personal disutility of the act rather than the harm to objective
interests and values the fundamental substance of the criminal wrong. 10 5
In connection with the problem of personal wrong, we should also
comment briefly on the novel proposition of the so-called subjective elements of unlawfulness. In his study on common law mens rea, Mueller
observed that in some cases the law requires a certain state of mind
beyond the regular requirement of mens rea. Thus; for burglary, it is not
sufficient that the burglar breaks and enters with mens rea; he must also
do so with the intent to commit a felony in that building.'
In another
group of crimes, the act as such is completely indifferent; it becomes
criminal only if it is committed with a certain state of mind. For example,
it is perfectly lawful for a man to take a woman from one state to another
101. WETz -L, DAS D'tuTsc a STRAFRECHT 4 (8th ed. 1963).

102. Id. at 56-57.
103. The arguments with which Welzel's theory was recently supported by Gunter
Stratenwerth, Handlungs- und Erfolgsunwert im Strafrecht, 79 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHImr
FUR STRAFIECHT 223, 237-250 (1963) are not convincing since Stratenwerth, in a one-sided
way, considers the problem of the criminal wrong only from the situation of the perpetrator
and thus neglects the objective effects the unlawful conduct produces.
104. WijRTEN ERGER, DIE GEISTIGE SITUATION DER DEUTSCHEN STRARECHTSWISSENSCHAlr

47-66 (1957).
105. MAURACE,

179-180, 233.

106. Mueller, supra note 98, at 1061-62.
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but he makes himself criminally responsible if he does so "for any other
immoral purpose."'1 °7 Mueller calls the special intent, with which the act
must be done, "additionalmens rea." In cases where the specific evil frame
of mind is the actual constituent element of criminal liability, he speaks
of "independent mens rea."
German criminal theory was troubled by the same problems. While
Mueller labelled those particular states of mind special forms of mens rea,
German doctrine placed them in the actus reus portion of the crime. The
German theory was that they influenced the substance of the wrong; it
labelled them as subjective elements of that wrong (subjective Unrechtsmer Kmak). l1

s

We need not decide which position is more accurate. Both have their
difficulties, especially in cases of independent mens rea. The question,
then, is whether penal liability is still based on an objective harm. Perhaps one could object to Mueller's view based on the fact that, in cases
which require an independent mens rea, it would seem that the perpetrator
is not punished for an objective harm but for his faulty state of mind.
Using the German interpretation, one might wonder whether, with the
notion of subjective elements of unlawfulness, the requirement of harm
is replaced by the assumption of some subjective ethical wrong. Actually,
it is not, although in situations containing subjective elements of unlawfulness, the punishability is dependent upon a certain state of mind. That
state of mind can never be considered the true basis of liability: the
specific frame of mind is but a filter through which harmful conduct,
which otherwise could not be distinguished is selected and separated from
harmless conduct. Hence, the subjective elements of unlawfulness are not
the ratio essendi, but merely the ratio cognoscendi of otherwise harmless
acts. "What makes the act unlawful," says Mueller, "is its recognized
misuse for socially harmful purposes by persons with evil intentions of a
particular sort."'0 9
The conclusion to be drawn from this inquiry is that the criminal
wrong, as a whole, is a three-fold phenomenon: the formal breach of the
107. Id. at 1064.
108. It took a long time before these elements were recognized as elements of unlawfulness rather than of personal guilt. The controlling point is that only by the presence of the
proscribed frame of mind can the proscribed wrong be committed. Thus, the subjective state

of mind is eventually decisive in determining whether an externally manifested act is deemed
unlawful or not. For more details see MAURACH, 179 and in particular the monograph by EB.
GESINNUNGSMERKMALE IM STRAMRECET (1958).

SCHMIDHAUSER,

109. Mueller, supra note 98, at 1064-The argumentation of the German doctrine is
similar. PROFESSOR SAX, GRUNDSXTZE DER STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE, in BETTERMANN-NIPPERDEY-

SCHEUNER, 3(2) DiE GRUNDRECHTE 941 (1959) thinks that the legislator does not use such
personal characteristics of the mind in order to proscribe an illegal form of life, but rather
to get those illegal violations of legal interests in his grips. Subjective definitional elements,
thus, only specify the wrong which consists in an objective harm.
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law, the personal ethical unworthiness of the act, and the detrimental
interference with some external object, the nature of which remains to be
determined. Although the objective wrong may be influenced by the
personal disutility of the act (as where the crime definition contains subjective elements of unlawfulness), the essence of the criminal wrong, i.e.,
the harm which the law seeks to prevent, must be found in the harmful
effects of the crime and not in the moral fault of the perpetrator.
This analysis gives us a negative description of harm: the material
substance of harm is neither the breach of the law nor the personal disutility of the act. We now can proceed to a positive determination of harm.
Since it seems useful to know what has already been clarified concerning
this question, we shall commence our investigation with a survey of the
most prominent American opinions on harm.
Survey of American Theories of Harm
As we have noted, the efforts made by Americans to define harm are
relatively recent. The first scholar to attempt a thorough and comprehensive interpretation of the harm element in connection with a description of the general principles of criminal law appears to have been
Professor Jerome Hall." 0 A discovery of principal importance was his
recognition of the fact that harm is not exclusively a question of either
fact or of normative evaluation alone, but a combination of both. We shall
consider this and other doctrines of Hall's throughout this paper, but at
this point it suffices to trace the main features of Hall's theory of harm.
From the outset, it is Hall's endeavor to distinguish the notion of harm
from the similar phenomena in the crime. Thus, Hall properly warns of the
mistake in equating harm with the external effect, of which any proscribed
conduct or behavior results."' On the other hand, he stresses the material
character of the crime as against formalistic misconceptions: "There is
nothing formal about being robbed or killed.""12 This statement, which

best fits visible injuries of common traditional crimes, must, however, be
adjusted to new fact situations in which crimes are often refined to such an
110. See HALL, GENERAL PRiNciPwEs 212-246; STTurEs IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL
CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURES 45 (1949).
111. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 214. A different question is whether Hail himself always attends to his own warning. As Honig observed, Hall seems to apply the notion of harm also
to the physical object of the perpetrator's action rather than restricting it to the object the
law seeks to protect (see Richard M. Honig, Criminal Law Systematized, 54 J. CRrm. L.,
C. & P.S. 276 (1963); also in DAS AMEERIKANISCHE STRAFRECHT, in MEZGER-SCH6NKE-JESCHECK, 4 DAS AUSLXNDISCHE STRAFRECHT DER GEGENWART 47-48 (1962). But with respect to
Honig's perhaps too formalistic apprehension of the legal interest (cf. infra III) it should
be kept in mind that in our opinion harm can also consist in the detriment to some physical
object and not only in the interference with the merely spiritually conceived legislative purpose. More to this in III.
112. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 215.
SCIENCE 143-157, 200-214, 235-252;
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extent that external injury is no longer noticeable. Taking this concept into
account, Hall sees penal harm as more than physical injury since in many
crimes, such as libel, perjury, and kidnapping, no physical injury is visible
although a harm was certainly inflicted. Therefore, the notion of harm
is expanded from tangibles to intangibles, from purely corporeal objects to
incorporeal interests and values. Thus, for Hall, harm is "a negation, a
disvalue, the lack of natural condition, and the like,""' or "harm must be
stated in terms of intangibles such as harm to institutions, public safety,
the autonomy 114
of women, reputation and so on. In short, harm signifies the
loss of value."

Thus far, Hall's suggestion advances two important novelties: first,
the attempt to find a notion of harm capable of fitting all sorts of crimes;
and second, as a necessary consequence, the abstraction of harm towards
a notion of incorporeal interests and values. Beyond that we can note a
third feature. Since, for Hall, the "locus of a value or a disvalue is not
simply in the thing itself, but is dependent on its perception by people,""'
harm necessarily implies the assumption of a normative relationship between the criminal objective and its social evaluation. In light of these
normative-empirical elements, penal harm appears as a "complex of fact,
valuation and interpersonal relation.""' 6
In appraising Hall's notion of harm, which indeed already reveals its
most fundamental elements, we nonetheless regret that he did not say
more concerning the normative aspect of the social-legal valuation of
harm. This is the most important link between the factual basis of harm
and its legal value and quality, and, considering Hall's conceptual framework as a whole, the impression is given that Hall has perhaps overaccentuated the idealistic nature of harm. Finally, where Hall speaks of
the social implication of criminal harm, he seems to have an ethical comprehension of the penal wrong in mind."' Thus, in short, Hall can be
characterized as an exponent of the incorporeality of penal harm.
Hall's proposition has been advanced and refined by Mueller who
differentiates harm in a tri-level abstraction:"18
113. Ibid.

114. Id. at 217. See also HALL, op. cit. supra note 110,
interests and values which have been destroyed, wholly or in
115. Ibid. Referring to HAROLD LEE, METHonoLoGy OF
COOPERATIVE INQUIRY 154 (Lepley ed. 1949) he defines value
virtue of which I care for it," GENERAL PRiNc PLES 217 n.15.

at 45 (CASES): "Harm implies
part."
VALUE THEORY, in: VALu--A
as "that aspect of an object by

116. Ibid.

117. Id. at 240-246, esp. at 242 where Hall suggests that, different from torts which almost invariably include actual damage to some person, crimes are signified by their social
harm for which actual damage is not essential. This social harm, however, Hall sees essentially determined by the "moral culpability of the actor."
118. Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal oj Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence
and Criminal Theory, 34 IND. L.J. 206, 220 (1959).
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a. In a general sense, every crime contains harm through the breach
of the law, the disobedience against the law, a contempt of the sovereign.
This is what we have previously denominated as the formal unlawfulness
of the crime.
b. On the intermediate level, there is harm to the legally protected
interests as they are distinguishable from the crime definition or from the
code context in which the crime is listed. Here, we find such broadly
defined harms as injuries to life, property, honor, etc. As Mueller demonstrated on another occasion, this is the harm which is ever-present in all
crimes "even where bones are not broken, metal not bent or wood not
charred.""' 9
c. In addition to this general material harm, many crimes involve an
additional problem-a harm to the specific purpose the criminal provision
is intended to serve. This follows from the fact that most crime definitions,
beyond their general purpose, are also designed to protect some special
interests or to protect those general purposes in a special way. For
example, People v. Von Rosen 2 ° dealt with a statute penalizing the
desecration of the United States flag. The preservation of the national
disemblem was the general purpose; the special purpose was to avoid
2'
flag.'
the
of
desecration
by
invited
peace
public
turbances of the
While considering the social aspect of harm Hall had spoken about,
Mueller made an interesting observation about the victims of a specific
harm. Only the third harm type is said to point to a particular individual;
the second harm type refers to a victim-group found in situations similar
to that of the actual sufferer of the loss. Such group members suffer only a
symbolic loss.' 2 2 Although the general validity of this conclusion can be
doubted, 2 3 it rightly stresses the social relevance of criminal harm. On
no account does the individual victim of a specific harm suffer alone;
rather, the public at large, which has an interest in the protection of all
recognized rights and interests, is suffering with him.
If harm implies values and interests, as Hall assumes, it seems important to know how these values must be conceived, how their nature
and structure are to be comprehended. "Value" and "interest" can be
119. Mueller, Victims of Criminal Violence, 8 J. PUB. L. 218, 233 (1959).
120. 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).

121. Another example is that of larceny by false pretenses which not only protects another's property interests but also his "liberty . . . to deal with what is his as he himself
chooses." Snyder, 24 BRoOKLYN L. REv. 34, 48 (1958), commenting on United States v.
Rubinstein, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 22 C.M.R. 313 (1957).

122. Compare supra note 119, at 221 with informative historical observations
on the
Roman and Germanic criminal laws.
123. In the case of the desecration of the flag where the specific harm consists in the
disturbance of the public peace, is not the public in general rather than an individual the
sufferer of the specific harm?

1965-19661

"HARM" IN CONCEPT OF CRIME

understood in a quite different sense. This idea is perhaps best demonstrated by contrasting Hall's and Mueller's rather idealistic notions of
legal interests to the fundamentally different approach of Beutel's "experimental jurisprudence."' 2 4 Beutel simply rejects any philosophical comprehension of values or other theoretical conceptions which could be the
object of criminal law.125 In his overstressed pragmatic attitude he even
denounces the term "interest" as being abused by philosophers and jurists
for purposes of theoretical and ethical speculation. Instead, he demands
that "interest" be actually identified "with the real wants of individuals or
society as they come into play or ought to come into play in the creation
of rules of law."' 26 These interests, so understood, are then organized by
Beutel into the three classifications of demands, desires and needs. 2 7
Beutel's extremely naturalistic approach contains aspects which are of
great significance in determining the factual substratum of values which
are legally protected. Considered as a whole, however, Beutel's notion of
legal interests is a purely sociological one, and, as such, the very opposite
of what Hall understands to be the values and interests which are implied
by harm. Whereas Hall raises them to idealistic heights, Beutel restricts
them to a more practical appraisal. He thereby overlooks the fact that
demands, desires and needs, even if sociologically founded, still need legal
evaluation and recognition in order to be of legal relevance and protected
by criminal statutes.
An intermediate position is held by Professor Snyder. It is regrettable
that Snyder's contributions to criminal theory 1 28 have not been fully recognized. Not only did he make detailed investigations into the various forms
in which criminal harm might occur,' 29 but he also professed a strong
belief in the requirement of harm as an essential part of the material substance of crime. 8 ° Likewise, he never tires of emphasizing that harm is,
or rather has to be, a fact. For him, this is a constitutional requirement
124. FREDERICK K.

BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS

A NEW BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957). He was very negatively reviewed by CAVERS, 10
J. LEGAL ED. 162 (1957).
125. Id. at 37-43.
126. Id. at 44.

127. To make clear what Beutel means by his terms, here is his explanation (at 44-45):
"'Demands' are wants which are expressed in such a manner that they may be objectively
stated. 'Desires' are human interests in things which the individual or group subjectively
wants, craves or would if encouraged claim. 'Needs' are those conditions or things in the
current state of society which, if present and effective, would enable the individual or society
to function with the least friction and more in accordance with the natural order of his or
its universe at that moment."
128. SNYDER, PREFACE TO JURISPRUDENCE (1954); AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1953); False Pretenses-Harm to Person from Whom Thing Obtained, 24 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 34 (1957/58).
129. Id. at 114-115 (INTRODUCTON).
130. SNYDER, op. cit. supra note 128, at 521-24 (PREFACE) ; Id. at 759-64.
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based on the due process clause. According to the sense and purpose of
this rule, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property through
imposition of a legal sanction except for harmful conduct. 131 Therefore,
penal harm is not merely a theoretical element of harm "ex hypothesi,"' 2
but it must be actually, or, in some crimes, at least potentially present.
Thus, "harm is not an immutable characteristic of certain human behavior
nor merely
a deduction from nonobservance of an authoritarian fiat but a
33
fact."'1

Snyder's notion of harm is a step forward in so far as he emphasizes
the significance of the factual side of harm. Although he also recognizes
the normative implications of legal interests, he nevertheless avoids concepts in which harm is reduced to a mental category which is perhaps still
intellectually conceivable but not factually sensible. Snyder thus preserves
the relationship of harm to its sociological basis. In other respects, the
problems remain the same. In particular there remains the clash between
Hall's value concept on one side and Beutel's pragmatic sociological position on the other; it can be demonstrated that both aspects taken together
make up the essence of penal harm.
The "Legal Interest" as the Focal Point of the Harm Concept
As we have seen in the foregoing section, Hall characterizes harm as
implying interests or values which have been destroyed wholly or in
part.13 The important term in this statement is "implying." It indicates
the recognition of a most significant phenomenon for analysis of harm,
namely, the fact that harm is but a negative concept-the destruction of
something good or the creation of something bad. "Harm," as such; does
not have a definite meaning. When one speaks of harm, the question
necessarily arises-harm to what? "Harm" indicates that some damage
has been done which is the result of some unlawful action. Seeking the
nature of harm, therefore, actually means ascertaining the objects which
can be harmed. In other words, we must examine exactly what is injured
by conduct which we believe to result in penal harm.
Although we cannot yet provide a final answer to this question, it seems
methodologically necessary to adopt a terminology for further discussion.
Anticipating our conclusions, we can best describe the objects of penal
harm by the term "legally recognized interests" or, more briefly, "legal
interests." Not only are the interests recognized by the constitutional
order (indeed, the very objectives of any criminal act) but also, as to the
terminology, the phrase "legal interest" seems most appropriate in indicating the substance and scope of penal harm. On the one hand, the
131. Id. at 520 (PREFAcE).
132. Op. cit. supra note 129, at 763.
133. Op. cit. supra note 131, at 523; 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 34, 37.
134. Op. cit. supra note 110, at 45 (CASES).
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meaning of legal interest is broad enough to comprise all potential objectives of criminal behavior, be they corporeal goods or intangible values,
and, conversely, it is narrow enough to avoid the vagueness and uncertainty of such terms of the socialist legal systems as "socially dangerous
acts." Accordingly; by preferring the term "legal interests" to any other,
we come close to Hall's concept of legal interests and values. Furthermore,
we are in agreement with the continental European theories, though these
tend to replace "interest" by "good" [as in Germany, Switzerland and
Austria (Rechtsgut) ] or by "value" [as in France and Italy (valeur legal,
valore legale)]. All mean essentially the same thing-the interest which
is legally recognized.
Authoritarian criminal concepts on the one side and, on the other,
criminal systems based on constitutional principles are essentially different
in the degree to which individual freedom is protected and guaranteed
against the sometimes overweening interest of society in preventing social
damage of any sort. It is only logical that in ideological systems like those
of socialist countries, where the well-being of the socialist order is the main
objective of all public and private activity, an open-ended concept of
criminal harm is more practical than a definite or limited one. If the
almighty State is able to prosecute any social damage, to punish any
socially dangerous act and, furthermore, if the government is free to
determine what it deems socially dangerous, the individual is completely
at the mercy of the public power. It is then possible to declare any conduct which is not in accordance with the interests of the ruling class as
socially dangerous. Where individual interests seem repugnant to the
interests of the government or the dominant social groups, an open and
vague concept of harm would make it easy to outlaw private action on the
grounds that it is not in accordance with the interests of the State and
thus is socially dangerous.
In a noteworthy address delivered at Wiirzburg University, the Italian
criminalist Giuseppe Bettiol impressively demonstrated the great extent
to which individual freedom is threatened by the socialist concept of
harm.'8 5 In a system in which the content of criminal harm is dependent
upon the unstable "historical conditionedness" of the legal interests,'3 6
penal harm necessarily loses all definite meaning. In such a system, even
the formal retention of the term "Rechtsgut" means little since it is
paralyzed by the notion of social dangerousness. In this interpretation, it
has merely the teleological-political function of expressing the momentary
interests of the socialist society, leaving no security to individual freedom
135. This address, entitled Das Problem des Rechtsguts in der Gegenwart, was later
published in German in 72 ZEITSCERFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRETSWI SSENSCrAFT 276
(1960).
136. Thus, the East German socialist RENNEBERO, DIE OBJEKTIVE SEITE DES VERBRECHENS
20 (1955).

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:345

of activity.' Contrary to this; the concept of legally circumscribed
interests, as understood here, remains the people's best safeguard against
authoritarian abuse. It was in this sense that Bettiol declared the concept
of legal interest, i.e., interests circumscribed by the law, to be the fundamental cornerstone of the crime concept, since on the one hand it is a
sufficient basis for the protection of social and individual values and interests and, on the other, the best guarantee for individual freedom and per138
sonal security.
This is precisely the reason why a society which believes in constitutional principles and legal security will prefer the concept and term of
legal interests to any proposition of social damage or social dangerousness.
Only social and individual interests which are legally circumscribed and
recognized are worthy of criminal protection.'1 9
III.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL INTEREST

The Dualistic Structure of the Legal Interest in General: Sociological
Substratum, Value Aspect
At first glance, the propositions of Hall and Mueller on the one side
and of Beutel on the other seem completely irreconcilable. There are
indeed basic differences. Hall places emphasis on the value character of
harm, characterizing harm as the negation of an ideal value rather than
as the destruction of a concrete, factually sensible good. Beutel sees only
the sociological wants and needs of society, thereby completely overlooking the fact that social or individual interests do not deserve legal
protection simply because they are claimed. Beyond that, they must also
have legal value character which means that interests, in order to obtain
criminal protection, must be worthy of criminal protection from the legal
point of view, i.e., by way of legal valuation.
The conclusion we must draw from this brief review of the opposite
positions of Hall and Beutel is that neither of them provides that extensive
proposition of the legal interests which we seek. Whereas the former is in
danger of attenuating the factual substance of penal harm to a generalizing
apprehension of ideal values, the latter misses the very value link by
means of which the otherwise purely sociological needs and wants are integrated into the legal and constitutional order, thus achieving recognition
as legal interests. The solution, therefore, seems to lie in an integrated
combination of both the value aspect and the sociological substratum, each
expressing a constituent part of the legal interest.
There are complications which might arise from shifting the solution
of a legal problem to the shaky stage of controversial philosophical
See Bettiol, supra note 135, at 283.
138. Id. at 285.
139. For more details on the constitutional basis of the legal interests see infra III.
137.
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opinions. Actually, we do not intend to resort to any of those numerous
systems and theories of values which already exist.14 ° Rather, we intend
to bring a philosophical distinction into play: a philosophical distinction
which is almost universally acknowledged; namely, the distinction between value quality, i.e., the value as such, and the value substratum or the
value carrier, i.e., the factual object on which the value rests. 4 '
In philosophical terminology, the value substratum must be evaluated.
The value substratum may be associated with various objects: physical
elements such as the human body, life, money, and house; or it may
consist of certain relationships and fact combinations, such as the confidential relationship between principal and agent, the advantageous expectancies of a shopkeeper based on the loyalty of his customers, the
efficiency
of public administration, or the integrity of the economic
42
order.1

The value quality, on the other hand; is what makes the value substratum important. In the words of Nicolai Hartmann, values are "that
through which things are valuable." 4 In philosophical understanding,
the value qualities are the true values. As such, they are neither comprehended as ideal entities of independent subsistence comparable to
Plato's "ideas,' 4 4 nor thought of as having an intellectual subsistence
recognized by human society as valuable. In Lee's words: "That aspect of
things whereby they are cared about is their value.' 45 In this sense they
are considered as objectives which merit realization either by creating
things or fact situations in accordance with them or by preventing evils
which are detrimental to them. The pragmatic value theories of Dewey 4 '
and Pound 4T are particularly favorable to this effect.
140. For a brief survey cf. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 215, also POUND, OUTLINES OF
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 79 (4th ed. 1928).

141. Cf. to the following NICOLAI HARTmANN, 1 ETHICS, ch. XIV (Stanton transI.
1950); Harold Lee, Methodology of Value Theory, in: VALuE-A COOPERATIVE INQUmY, at
147-166 (Lepley ed. 1949); HEImuCHt
RICKERT, A SYSTE DER PHImosoPHIE 96 et seq.
(1921).
142. See VrAL SCHWANDER, DAS SCHWEIEzalSCHE STRAFMESETZBUCH 62 (1952): Interests
to be legally protected may be "any things, situations or other circumstances which might

be of material or ideal value for an individual or a group of persons." Similarly, HANS
WELZEL, DAs DEUTSCHE STRAFREcHT 4 (8th ed. 1963).

143. HARTMANN, op. cit. supra note 141, at 186.
144. Ibid. Similar also Ernst Seelig, following Alexius v. Meinong, reviewed by G. 0. W.
MUELLER, 47 J. CRam. L., C. & P.S. 539, 543-44 (1957). In Rickert's philosophy the values
have a peculiar form of existence: they are "valid" (geltend); cf. RICKERT, op. cit. supra
note 141, at 113, also his KuLTURWISSENSCnArr UXND NATURWISsENscnmAT 20-22 (4/5th ed.

1921).
145. RICKERT, op. cit. supra note 141, at 147.
146. Cf. ibid.
147. RoscoE PoUND, CoNmsvePoRARY JURISTIC THEORY 82 (1940); see also the critical
review by Powers, Some Reflections on Pound's Jurisprudence of Interests, 3 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 10, 17 (1953).
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For the philosopher, it is crucial to determine whether the values are,
in fact, ideal entities or only creations or postulates of the rational and
ethical capacity of the human personality. For the limited purpose of this
legal analysis, however, we can leave this question open since legal values
always have their normative basis in the value system of the constitution. 48 The important point is to show the difference between the value
substrata, the factual value carriers which are to be evaluated, and the
values themselves, through which the value substrata become valuable.
What conclusions are to be drawn from this philosophical distinction
for the legal problems of harm or the legal interests? To answer this
question, the character of law and the legal order must be briefly considered.
Contrary to natural science, which deals with the "is" of facts and
situations, jurisprudence, in its deepest sense, is a science of "oughts"
and thus, like philosophy, of values. Law does not merely describe life
and society, State and individuals, as they are, but it considers them as
they ought to be. For this reason, jurisprudence is not a descriptive science
like physics or biology, but rather an evaluating science setting up rules
for behavior among individuals or between the state and its subjects, as
well as coordinating the relations of men to their things.' 49 A necessary
consequence is that legal interests cannot be treated like the objects of
natural science. Even though they do and must have a factual basis in the
demands and needs of society, such interests are objects of legal evaluation. Since they are integrated into the comprehensive context of legal
principles and values, they are part of the legal order.
In this respect, legal interests have the same structure as "goods" in
the general philosophical sense. Like "goods," which the philosopher
understands to mean the actually evaluated objects or things which carry
a value, 5 ° "legal interests" are related to both-to the legal values as well
as to the factual sociological needs. Thus, "legal interest" is a relational
concept in the sense of Rickert's "valuable reality."' 5 It is the integration of the sociological "is" and the normative "ought" of legal principles
and ideals, for only interests which are found valuable in the eyes of the
law can be recognized as legal interests.
148. More on this later in this section.
149. On the character of jurisprudence as "cultural science," i.e., a science of values
rather than of facts, see RICKERT, op. cit. supra note 144, and particularly GUSTAV RADBRUICH, REcHrsPB IoSoPmE 91-104 (5th ed. Wolf 1956).
,150. See HARaTMANN, Op. cit. supra note 141, at 186; also RICKERT, op. cit. supra note
141, at 96: in order to be realized, values have to adhere to objects which thereby become
"goods."
151. RICKERT, ibid. On these problems from the legal point of view see
ERTS, BEITRXGE ZUR LEHRE VON DEN SUBJEXTIVEN UNRECHTSELEMENTEN IM

(1934).
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Thus, basing the analysis on the philosophical distinction between
value quality and value substratum, we find that the legal interest comprises two elements: as "value substrata" the factual interests of the
society, the state or its members require legal evaluation and recognition;
as "value qualities" the legal values and ideals of the respective state or
society require conformity through which factual interests become legally
valuable.
The necessity of relating the interests protected in a crime to a legal
value has been recognized by Professor Richard Honig. 152 Similar considerations can also be found in Dean Pound's legal philosophy. Pound
suggests that there are interests which, as such, are not created but/found by the law. These interests, however, must be recognized and
adjusted by the law, with the result that assertions or demands inconsistent with legal postulates are eliminated from immediate consideration
by the legal order. 5 3 This is basically the same as differentiating between
interests as the factual value carriers and as the value qualities recognized
by the legal order. Perkins' conception of social harm approximates this
distinction when he describes harm as "every invasion of any social
interest which has been placed under the protection of a criminal sanction."' 5 4 Here, too, the underlying premise is the distinction between a
factual interest and its legal evaluation.
Although still considering the basic structure of legal interests in general, it is helpful to comment on misconceptions of the factual side of
legal interests. By a constantly increasing process of abstraction and
etherealization, the concept of legal interests is in danger of losing its
material basis. Like Hall, in his rather ideal concept of harm, there are
others who would submerge the special interests, needs, or wants of individuals or social groups into the general interests of the government
through the protection of all valuable goods within its reach. For example,
although the crime of larceny is designed to protect property rights as
such, i.e., ownership as a fundamental social institution, a theft of
another's property is not only a harm to the government's interest in
preserving and safeguarding property as a social value, but it also causes
harm to the specific proprietary rights of the individual. Therefore, it
is inaccurate to define legal interest only in terms of the state's interest in
protecting the respective right or institution. The individual's own rights
as well must be taken into the concept of the legal interest.
For this reason, we cannot agree with Perkins' suggestion to turn the
"traditional label" of "offense against the person" into "offense against
152. HoNiG, DIE ENWILLGUNG DES VERLETZTEN 98 (1919).
153. Pound, The End of Law, 27 HARV. L. REv. 195, 233 (1914); A Theory of Social
Interests, 15 PROCEED. Am. Soc. 16 (1920).
154. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 653 (1957) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
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the state in form of harm to the person.""' Likewise, the German
criminalist Jiirgen Baumann 5" contends that in larceny no specific or concrete proprietary rights of an injured person should be considered as
being protected beyond the general interests in property itself. The question may be raised whether this absorption of the special individual interest by one general interest of the state is not a complete reversal of the still
valid notions of early criminal law. At that time, the interests of individuals were the very substance of public protection. Through the king's
peace, the once private interests were absorbed by the abstract concept of
the king's interest in keeping law and order by suppressing any kind of
harm.' 57 If the connection of our criminal law with the sociological substratum is to be preserved, this growing trend of abstraction must be
terminated;"" legal interests must once again be related to their natural
basis-namely, to specific rights and needs of individuals, social groups, or
the State. Even Richard Lange, a German scholar who espouses an
"immaterialistic" harm concept,' 5 9 conceded that the social-ethical value
element of the legal interest must be related to a sociologically founded
interest.6 o
In this context, finally, we should comment on the theory, profoundly
developed and defined by Professor Honig in his historical-theoretical
study of the consent of the injured,' 6 ' which became known as the
"formal" concept of legal interests.
Since the naturalistic, sociological concept of "Rechtsgut" as represented by the German Reichsgericht had led to various difficulties ,162
Honig tried to explain the legal interests from the intent of the statute
without considering outside factors or elements. Consequently, he came
to define Rechtsgut as "that categorical synthesis by which jurisprudential
thinking tries to comprehend sense and purpose of the single criminal rules
in a compressed form."' 63 Therefore, Rechtsgut is solely the legislativelyrecognized purpose of penal laws in its shortest formula.' 64
155. Id. at 21 with n.97.
156. JURGEN BAUMANN, STRAFRcHrT, ALLGEMKINER TrEm 110 (2d ed. 1961).
157. Cf. supra section I.
158. Cf. also TH. WiURTENBERGER, DIE GEISTIGE SITUATION DER BEUTIGEN STRARECHTSWISSENScHAFT 68 (1957); MAURACH 170.
159. KO-LRAUSCa-LANGE, STRAFGESETZBUCH 13 (43rd ed. 1961) where Lange denies that
the single individual good injured could be decisive for the determination of the legal interest; so he understands "legal interest" as "inviolability (!) of life, health, property . . ." etc.
160. Ibid.
161. HONIG, op. cit. supra note 152.
162. Cf. in particular the critical review by Dahm, Der Methodenstreit in der heutigen
Strafrechtswissenschajt, 57 Zmnrscmu'r F-R DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECUTSwISSENSCRsr

231 (1938).
163. HONIG, op. cit. supra note 152, at 94.
164. Ibid.

225,
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Since this concept precludes reference to facts outside the statute, it
seems inconsistent with our proposition that legal interests, in one respect,
must have their basis in factual interests of the society. Such inconsistency
is explained by a consideration of this formalistic harm concept as a
method of stating and interpreting the intentions of the statute. Functioning in this manner, it can facilitate a proper application and construction
of the law. It is, indeed, the best expression of the ratio legis of a penal
statute. 16 5 Beyond this, however, it cannot accomplish more. In particular,
it provides no yardstick by which the legislators could determine what
harms ought to be criminally sanctioned. This can only be determined by
use of a material concept of legal interests in which the factual interests of
society are considered.
So far, we have determined only the basic dualistic structure of the legal
interests. The two constituent elements naturally require further explanation. This special analysis shall commence with the sociological factual
side of the legal interests by distinguishing harm from similar phenomena
in the crime. Following that, the value aspect of the legal interests, i.e.,
their constitutional evaluation, shall be dealt with in greater detail.
Harm-Its Distinction from Similar Phenomena in the Crime
The FactualSide of the Legal Interests. It is a fact of common experience that all criminal acts are not of the same genus. In examining various
crimes, therefore, it is not surprising to discover many different forms in
which criminal acts and their harmful results appear. Whereas in some
the object of the act is identical with the interest the law seeks to protect,
in others it is quite difficult to determine the protected legal interest, even
though the external result may be quite evident. In these latter cases the
things or persons which are perhaps injured by or at least involved in
the illegal act are not identical with the interests that the criminal provision is designed to preserve.
An example of the first type of crime is murder. Here human life, the
interest to be protected, is also the object of the act of killing. This,
however, may not necessarily exist in other crimes. In forgery, for
example, the harm is not to the paper on which the falsification was committed but to the commercial and social community's interest in being free
from instruments which are not genuine. 166 Thus, the true end of criminal
protection is the commercial public's interest in the safe exchange of
property. In rape, when the perpetrator abuses a woman to secure sexual
intercourse against her will, what is protected? Certainly not the sexual
organs as part of the body but rather the woman's interest in being the
sole mistress of her sexual freedom. The same peculiarity can be observed
165. Therefore Dahm, supra note 162, at 232-3 and BAUMANN, op. cit. supra note 156
are not quite correct when rejecting the formal concept of Rechtsgut completely.
166. PEaRIs 290.
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with other crimes, particularly those against property. Thus, in larceny,
the legal interest is not the thing stolen nor its physical condition, but
the former possessor's proprietary rights in it.
Even in murder, life per se was not always the true object of criminal
protection, but rather the king's interest in saving his soldiers. Similarly,
mayhem, today designed to safeguard physical integrity, formerly sought
the protection of the fighting strength of the king's soldiers.167 This makes
it difficult, if not impossible, to provide a constantly accurate picture of
the legal interests protected by the various crime provisions. It strongly
supports our contention, however, that the object of the criminal attack is
not necessarily the interest to be defended. This proposition could be
demonstrated by many more examples. 6 The reason for this phenomenon
is simple: many harms consist not in the change of physical things or
conditions produced by the crime but in the infringement of interests or
rights which are only intellectually conceivable. However, since a crime,
in order to be a crime; must be manifested by some overt act, the external
effect must be visible in those crimes in which the legal interest is of an
immaterial nature. For example, the infringement of an owner's rights is
evidenced by the taking and carrying away of a piece of his property;
forgery is committed by producing a legal document which is not genuine
though an actual fraud may not have resulted therefrom.' 69 These
examples clearly demonstrate that all criminal acts require an external
platform, a sensually perceivable object, to be manifested. These cases
also prove-and this is the more significant point-that each crime
requires the distinguishing of the object of the protection, i.e., the legal
interest; and of the object of the act, the physically concrete thing through
whose infringement or illegal use the proscribed harm appears.'
With regard to German criminal theory, investigations into this problem date back to Schiitze and von Liszt, both prominent scholars of the
last century.' 7' For a long period it seemed as if no satisfactory result
could be reached. At the same time, the above-described distinction between the legal interest and the object of the act was generally recognized
in German criminal jurisprudenceY.2 Since it is a distinction of a general
nature and, as such, not peculiar to a specific criminal theory, there is no
reason why it cannot also be applicable and helpful to problems of
American criminal theory.
167. Cf. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 102-104 (17th ed. Turner 1958) ; RUSSEL,
ON CRIME 693-4 (11th ed. Turner 1958).
168. Cf. MAURACH 171.

169. Cf. PERKINS 296, 304.
170. The need for this distinction was particularly urged by Honig, Criminal Law
Systematized, 54 J. CRnm. L., C. & P.S. 276-277 (1963).
171. See the very informative survey by MAX HnmscHBERG, DIE SCKUTZOBJEKTE DER
VF.RBRECHEN 14 (1910).
172. Cf. MAURACH 171; BAUMANN, op. cit. supra note 156, at 109.
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It is not difficult to make a further distinction between the so-called
simple conduct crimes and those which must evidence a proscribed result,
with this distinction becoming particularly important in considering the
relationship between harm and causation.
It is evident that where the harm of the crime consists only in the impairment of an intellectually cognizable interest, this interest must
necessarily be different from the external result of the overt act. However, it is not necessary that the external result of such crimes be uniform.
In some crimes, in which the legal interest is different from the object of
the act, the conduct must cause a certain legally defined effect; in others,
the criminal act need only be externally noticeable. Perjury, for example,
can be demonstrated by proof of the false testimony, regardless of its
consequences; 7 one can be punished for having carried dangerous
weapons even though they were not used for any criminal purpose.' 7 4 In
these cases the criminal conduct, as such, produces the proscribed harm,
while in others a certain legally circumscribed result must be shown, e.g.,
for malicious mischief, physical injury to some property by which its
utility is impaired or its value materially diminished must be proven." 5
Of course, in such simple conduct crimes 171 (so denominated because the
conduct is held sufficient to procure the proscribed harm), all those definitional circumstances have to be present. Actually, this requirement is
no more than a problem of legality, the aspects of which will be dealt with
later.
Legal interests may be injured in many different ways and from
various directions. Criminology perhaps best teaches us the vast number
of ways property interests can be infringed, bodily health endangered, or
personal honor impaired. Normally, the law does not prohibit all imaginable forms of harm to legal interests; only the most serious harms are
proscribed. This is the reason for the need of crime definitions stating
circumstances and conditions under which certain harmful conduct may
be punished. Thus, a false statement is not perjury unless it was made
before a court; homicide is murder only if committed with malice
aforethought.
It is, of course, a requirement of legality that all conditions specified
in the definition of the crime be met in order to warrant a conviction for
the alleged crime. It is quite a different question to consider the fulfillment
of the definitional conditions as part of the proscribed harm. This seems
to be the opinion of Professor Hall. His statements on harm and the
circumstances of the criminal act cannot be interpreted to mean anything
173. Cf. PERKrNS 382.

174. Id. at 365.
175. Id. at 282.
176. This terminology was chosen according to that used in the German criminal law
("schlichte Tdtigkeitsdelikte" vs. "Erfolgsdelikte"), cf. MAuRAcH 289; Honig, supra note 31.
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except that the legally relevant circumstances of a crime are part of the
criminal harm. 7 7 This is not entirely correct. While it is true that those
circumstances are decisive prerequisites for the accomplishment of the
proscribed harm, this is not the same as being a part of the harm. Certainly, there are many crimes where a required circumstance or result is
identical with the proscribed harm. For example, if murder requires the
killing of a human being, the destruction of a life is at the same time the
proscribed harm. In other crimes, however, a certain condition or consequence, described in the definition, is only the indication that the proscribed harm was effectuated. Yet, this does not make the result a part of
the harm in question. Thus, in larceny, which prohibits the taking of an
object belonging to another, penal harm is not done to the stolen item but
to the possessor's proprietary rights. Again, for perjury, a judicial proceeding must take place in which the false testimony is sworn. The harm,
however, is not done to the court whose presence is a necessary circumstance of perjury, but rather to the ideal interest of the "integrity of a

sworn statement in a judicial proceeding.'

17

In the same manner, we could analyze crime definitions and find that in
all crimes, except those in which the object of the act is concurrently the
legal interest, a difference can be noted between harm to the protected
interest and the other definitional circumstances, conditions, or consequences which must be present in order to fulfill the requirements of the
crime definition. This is not a problem of the principle of harm, but a
requirement of the principle of legality; according to this principle, there
is no crime unless the perpetrator's conduct falls squarely within the
prohibition.' 79 By no means does that demand the inclusion of these circumstances as part of the penal harm.
This idea may be demonstrated by two cases. In the Illinois case of
People v. Von Rosen,'8 0 the defendant was charged with desecration of
the United States flag. Though the prohibition did not require that the
desecration disturb the public peace, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the conviction for lack of such disturbance. The court did so on the
ground that the legislative purpose of the prohibition was to secure public
peace that could be gravely endangered by a desecration of the flag.
177. Cf., GENERAL PRiNciPLES 237-240, which also contains a review of other contributions to the circumstances in the crime (Salmond, Smith). For the purpose of this analysis,
however, it does not help further to enlarge on Smith's distinction between "pure" and
"consequential circumstances" or the peculiarity of mitigating or aggravating conditions.
When we speak of "circumstances," we mean those circumstances which are constituent requirements of a crime, regardless of whether they are subjective elements like premeditation
and malice or objective ones such as the thing stolen, damage by fraud, etc.
178. PERKiNs 382.
179. See Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory, 34 IND. L.J. 217 (1959).
180. 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
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Analyzing this result, we find that proof of the desecration was obviously
required by the principle of legality. However, if the desecration of the
flag is primarily prohibited in order to preserve public peace, we must
conclude that public peace rather than the dignity of the flag was the
special legal interest of that provision.18 ' With respect to the principle of
harm, the Illinois court was, therefore, correct in requiring proof of harm
to that special interest. Of course, very often the harm to be prevented
is also part of the crime definition. In such cases, the harm requirement
is also covered by the principle of legality. In order to avoid any misconceptions or misinterpretations, one should always distinguish the definitional circumstances which are covered by the principle of legality from
the proscribed harm which is a problem of the harm requirement.
Another instructive example is the New Jersey case of State v. Bruns."2
There, a borough ordinance prohibited:
(a) uttering any loud, profane, etc., language "in a public place"; or
(b) uttering any offensive, indecent, etc., language "which tends to
endanger the public peace."
The defendant, who had shouted loudly and in profane language in a
photography store, was discharged by the court, and rightly so. As to
(a), the principle of legality was not fulfilled since a photography store
is not a public place. As to (b), there was no danger to the public peace
which the legal interest of the ordinance was designed to protect. Thus,
there was a lack of the proscribed harm. Further, the requirements of
legality were not met since the special harm, namely a danger to the public
peace, was made a part of the crime definition. Since a danger to the
public peace was not present, the harm requirement, as well as the principle of legality, prevented a conviction.
A still more interesting question is whether the defendant could have
been convicted under subsection (a) if he had shouted profanely in a
public place without endangering the public peace. In this case the
requirements of the legality principle would have been clearly met; but
what about the requirement of harm? Is not the obvious purpose of the
prohibition to protect the public peace? In the writer's opinion, as in the
Von Rosen case, the defendant would have to be discharged, although all
of the definitional circumstances were proven, because the proscribed
harm was not present. This case also shows that, for reasons of legal
security, it is vitally important to specify, in the crime definition, the
harm to be prevented. This is the only method by which the harm requirement can be given the more effective protection of the legality principle.
Therefore, when analyzing and interpreting criminal definitions, a sharp
distinction must be drawn between the proscribed harm and the defini181. Cf. Mueller, supra note 179, at 221.
182. 134 N.J. 393, 48 A.2d 577 (1946).
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tional circumstances, conditions, and consequences of the act which are
not part but only prerequisites of the proscribed harm.
Differentiating harm from similar effects of the crime gives one a firm
basis for determining the position of harm within the crime. First, we
shall ascertain the relationship harm has to the act and actus reus. The
answer to this depends largely upon how one defines actus reus, a very
controversial problem. According to one opinion which probably originated with Kenny,'1 3 actus reus is understood as the result of an act-"the
natural consequences of the criminal acts themselves."'8 4 In this sense,
actus reus would be identical with the definitional consequences of the
crime and, thus, could still be distinguished from harm. This is no longer
possible, however, since Turner, though in principle following Kenny,
defined actus reus as "such result of human conduct as the law seeks to
prevent.' 8

5

In this sense, actus reus and harm are similar. Since harm, as

the violation of legal interests, can be nothing more than the result of the
act, and if Kenny and Turner were correct, one of the two terms would
be superfluous. In order to avoid any misleading terminology, the best
approach would be to abandon either "harm" or actus reus.
It seems extremely doubtful that Kenny's and Turner's notion of actus
reus is correct. Not only is it rejected by many prominent authors, 8 6 but
also; from a logical point of view, actus reus must be more than the result
of the act. Since actus reus, i.e., the evil act,8 7 also contains the notion of

act, it cannot be the effect of the act alone, but rather must include the
act itself. The act is part of the actus reus. This also has an effect on the
relationship between actus reus and harm. Since harm is the result of the
criminal act, harm and act cannot be equated and, since actus reus includes
the act, neither can harm and actus reus. Rather, actus reus is to be
interpreted as the comprehensive notion of act, harm, and its connecting
link, causation, with actus expressing the voluntary physical movement
in the sense of conduct and reus expressing the fact that this conduct
results in a certain proscribed harm, i.e., that it "causes" an injury to the
legal interest protected in that crime.
Therefore, with this viewpoint, acceptance of Stallybrass' narrow
interpretation of actus reus is impossible.' In his opinion, which closely
183. Cf. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 222.
184. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRnIqnAL LAW 9 (12th ed. 1926); similarly PERKINS at 653,
723-4.
185. TURNER, THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 195 (Radzinowicz & Turner eds.
1945) ; see also KENqy-TuRNER, op. cit. supra note 167, at 14.
186. Cf. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 222-37; GLANVILLE WIuLIAms, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 16-21 (2d ed. 1961).

187. Cf. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1053 (1958).
But Perkins is misleading when he translates actus reus as "guilty act" since a "guilty" act
not only requires actus reus but also maens rea.
188. See Stallybrass in: TURNER, op. cit. supra note 185, at 397.
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follows the path of Austin' 89 and Holmes,"' actus reus is no more and no
less than the overt act. 9 ' Obviously, this interpretation fails to take into
account the real significance of reus. The term certainly cannot mean
"overt," for this aspect of criminal conduct is already inherent in the
notion of "act." It is probably closer to its meaning if it is understood as
evil or illegal. As Professor Mueller pointed out, reus conveys the firm
implication that criminal law is "not concerned with just any act, but
with a legally relevant act. Actus reus connotes an outlawed act which fits
'
a penal norm."192
As such, actus is only reus if it causes precisely the
harm which was prohibited by law. Actus reus is indeed capable of
uniting all the objective elements of the crime, i.e., those which constitute
the formal and material unlawfulness as distinct from the subjective
mens rea.
On the other hand, Glanville Williams overextends the scope of actus
reus to include such subjective characteristics of the crime as excuse,' 9
while rightly trying to comprehend with actus reus the whole reach of the
objective unlawfulness.'
This is but a matter of minor concern here.
Basically, Williams seems to recognize that act, harm, and causation
together are essential elements of actus reus.
It can be concluded that harm is neither the act itself nor identical with
the actus reus. It is rather the causal result of an act, the injury to a legal
interest caused by the. act. This explanation of actus reus is quite clear
as long as we restrict our conclusions to crimes which, by their very definitions, require a certain defined effect. What is to become of the so-called
simple conduct crimes which were considered earlier? 9 5 In declaring that
act and harm cannot be the same, are we not then contradicting the
concept of simple conduct crimes which do not require a certain proscribed effect? This would be true if criminal harm was sought in the
personal ethical wrong or disvalue of the acting subject rather than in
the harm to objective values or interests not identical with the actor.
Only in a theory where the personal disvalue of the act is considered the
essence of the wrong would the act, regardless of its effects, be the true
harm." 6 From our analysis, where the impairment of certain objective
189. AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE 415 (5th ed.).
HOLMES, THE COmIION LAW 91 (47th print).
191. Also Hibbert & Jenks in 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 2; cf. Hitchler, The Physical

;190.

Element of Crime, 39 Dicx. L. REv. 99 (1934/35).
192. Mueller, supra note 187.
193. WmLIA

s, op. cit. supra note 186, at 20.

194. Id. at 18: "actus reus means the whole definition of the crime with the exception
of the mental element-and it even includes a mental element insofar :s that is contained in
the definition of an act."
195. Supra I.

196. So particularly Welzel with his theory of the personal disvalue of the act, see
supra II.
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legal interests is the basis of criminal punishment, the act cannot be the
harm itself but the cause of harm.
This is also true with regard to simple conduct crimes. "Simple conduct"
crimes by no means suggests that the conduct itself should be deemed the
criminal harm. This connotation merely implies that certain conduct
committed under the proscribed circumstances is deemed sufficient to
cause the unlawful harm, even though it may not have caused any physical
or otherwise visible damage. This can be clearly shown in perjury, where
the false statement in a judicial proceeding on a material matter is considered a crime. In order to prove the harm of perjury, it is not necessary
to show damage to the parties involved or to anyone else, for the harm
concerned with is invisible since it is directed against the integrity of
sworn statements before a court. In a simple conduct crime, harm is
assumed to be caused by the legally prohibited conduct regardless of the
external consequences. 1 97 The following section on harm and causation
may elucidate the peculiar concept of causation in simple conduct crimes.
Causation is one of the key problems of criminal theory. As divergent
as the propositions of the various theories may be, the basis or starting
point of all approaches, both in Anglo-American and Continental law, 198
is the meaning of causation in its scientific sense, i.e., the principle that the
defendant's conduct was the necessary cause of the harmful result.
In American law this natural principle of causation is best characterized by the so-called "but-for" rule which means that "but for the defendant's conduct" the criminal effect would not have occurred. 9 In
German law this is signified by the conditio sine qua non theory. This
theory states that every imaginable condition culminating in a corresponding failure of the result is a necessary condition of the harmful
197. Since the question of harm in simple conduct crimes is a problem common to every
criminal theory, the German doctrine also dealt with it. There is a general agreement, except for Wezel's theory of the personal disvalue of the act, that in pure conduct crimes the
basis of liability is not the indifference of the actor to ethical-legal values, but the impairment of a legal interest vital to the common good. BAUMANN, Op. cit. supra note 156, at 166.
198. In Anglo-American law there are some very recent extensive publications on causation problems with appraisals of the various theories; see Ruy, Causation in Criminal Law,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 773 (1958); HART & HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). An approach basically new to the American Law was undertaken by G. O. W. Mueller, Causing
Criminal Harm, in ESSAYS IN CRIMMNAL SCIENCE 169 (Mueller ed. 1961), recommending the
limitation of the causal chain by a teleological device. See also Hall, Causation, in STUDIES
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CmnAL THEORY 158,
TRAECER,

DER KAUSALBEGRII7

IM

ZIVIL- UND

objektive Zurechnung, in 1 FRANx-FESTOABE
MAURACH 151-166.

199. See Mueller, id. at 172-3.

199 (1958). As for the German law see
(1904); Honig, Kausalitit und

STRAFRECHT

174 (1930); more recently the survey by
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In this sense, "all antecedents which contribute to a given result

' 20 1
are, as a matter of fact, the causes of that result."

However, as recognized by an increasing number of authors, the establishment of causation in its scientific sense is but the first step. The problem then concerns the limitation of the endless chain of causes to those
which may reasonably be imputed to the defendant. This is not a question
of natural science but, as Mueller termed it, a "juridical concept." 0
While it is a far-reaching problem, it need not be considered here since
in the context of harm and causation the only concern is natural causation, the question, namely, of how harm may be caused by criminal conduct, i.e., whether in all crimes we can find the same causal link between
conduct and harm or whether there are differences corresponding to
different types of crimes. For this answer, we must return to the distinction between crimes with a certain definitionally required result and simple conduct crimes.
From the foregoing section (II), it is apparent that the causal relation
between act and external injury is not necessarily the same as that between act and harm. Only where the legal interest to be protected consists of a physical good (such as life, body or a corporeal thing) or some
other external (monetary, proprietary) value can causation in its scientific sense be relevant. The same is true concerning crimes which, by their
definition, require a certain proscribed result. In the crime of false pretenses, for example, the offender must obtain money or some other chattel
from another;20 3 in malicious mischief, the criminal conduct must cause
the destruction of another's property.20 4 In all such cases, there exists a
causal relation between the act and the definitionally required result. In
simple conduct crimes, such causality is not evident.
As discussed earlier,205 simple conduct crimes, such as perjury or rape,
are directed against legal interests of an immaterial nature. While the
harm affects legal interests which are of an ideal nature, the commission
of these crimes must take place in external reality in order to produce
an overt act. Therefore, in these crimes, the act and the harm occur at
different levels. The act is a phenomenon of the natural world while the
interests, when of an immaterial nature, are harmed in a manner which
is intelligible and evident. For this reason, it seems rather logically and
200. Particularly advocated by Glaser and Von Buri, this was also the position of the
German Reichsgericht; cf. Mueller, id. at 189. The American "sine-qua-non-theory" is in
principle the same, Cf. PERKINS at 598.
201. PERKINS, ibid.

202. Mueller, supra note 198, at 212; see also at 173.
203. Cf. PERKINS 251.
204. Id. at 282.

205. Supra I.
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ontologically untenable that the connection between act and harm can be
called a truly causal one in conduct crimes. There is no real crossover
from the act which occurs in external reality to the interests which are
ideally supporting the needs and demands of the social, commercial, or
cultural life.
This is probably the reason why German doctrine, without giving an
explanation, denies a causal relation between act and harm in simple conduct crimes. 20 6 Here, the principle of causation is replaced by a process
tantamount to a legal presumption: the legislature presumes, provided
certain acts are performed, that the legally recognized interests will be
violated or at least endangered. In forgery, for example, there is no need
to prove that falsification "caused" harm to the commercial interest; 207
rather, it is assumed that any falsification impairs that interest. Thus,
Maurach can validly speak of an "insoluble interlacing of act and
effect ' 2°8 (in the sense of harm) in simple conduct crimes. Here, the crime
is committed when all definitional elements are present; therefore, forgery
is accomplished with the falsification, even if it were not followed by any
other harmful consequence, such as damage to a bona fide purchaser. The
harm consists in the fact that commercial life is endangered by the very
existence of a forged instrument.
This observation of a presumption of harm in place of an actual causal
harm is also supported by Snyder's classification of harm groups. 0 9
Snyder discovered that in addition to crimes for which an actual or potential harm to certain persons or to the public at large must be proven, there
are crimes in which a public harm is presumed, even though an effect on
other persons may or may not be involved. He cites as examples a bribe
which is immediately refused by the persons to whom it was offered and
false testimony which is heard by other persons. "These acts do happen
and must be proved for
the overt act to be complete, though the harm
2 10
they do is presumed.

These are exactly the types of simple conduct crimes we have in mind.
The principle of legality demands that an overt act be present, but once
the act is proven, the harm is assumed. We can conclude; therefore, that
in simple conduct crimes the causal relation between act and harm is replaced by a legal presumption of harm, provided all other definitional
requirements are met.
206. E.g., MAURACH 189. He sees the main significance of the distinction between simple

conduct crimes and crimes with a definitionally required result in the fact that only in the
latter is the problem of causation of concern. Similarly BAUMANN, Op. cit. supra note 156,
at 176.
207. PEIKiNs 290.
208. MAURACH

150.

209. SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114-115 (1953).
210. Id. at 115.
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This limited applicability of the concept of causation requires caution
in any consideration of causation in connection with harm. It is, therefore,
quite doubtful whether Mueller's contention that the principle of causation is "also applicable to offenses in which seemingly conduct alone constitutes a prohibited harm,"" l is tenable in this general form.2 12 Mueller
seems to overlook the fact that only legal interests in the form of natural,
corporeal, or otherwise external goods and only definitional circumstances
and facts that are of an external nature can stand in a truly causal connection with the act.
Corpus delicti seems to have no universally recognized meaning, since
it is employed in describing quite divergent functions of criminal law and
procedure.21 3 However, there are three frequently used interpretations of
corpus delicti.
If used as suggested by Strahorn, corpus delicti comes close to our
apprehension of harm. For Strahorn, corpus delicti is one of the three.
elements of criminal liability21 4 and is proven if "a certain social damage,"
i.e., "a criminal result," is present.215 From this statement, it would seem
that Strahorn identifies harm with corpus delicti. If one considers the context of this statement, one might wonder if Strahorn did not understand
corpus delicti in the general sense of the external effects required by most
crime definitions. The latter interpretation is strongly supported by Strahorn's use of the term "criminal result." With this interpretation, however,
corpus delicti would be simply another expression of the definitionally
required consequences of the act. As such, it must be distinguished from
the harm to legal interests.
The second and most common use of corpus delicti considers the definitional circumstances and conditions of the crime, indicating the occurrence of a specific kind of injury or loss plus the perpetrator's criminal
act as the source of the loss. 2 16 On occasion this interpretation is extended
to comprise all the material elements of the crime charged. 1 7 In this
sense, the notion of corpus delicti serves as a function of the principle of
legality in requiring all definitional elements of the crime to be proven.
Thus interpreted, corpus delicti is but a comprehensive expression of the
external circumstances and consequences defined and required for proof
211. Mueller, op. cit. supra note 198, at 212.
212. CLARK & MARSHALL, ON TiE LAW Op CRIMES 183 (6th ed. Wingersky, 1958), are

also unaware of the fact that the problem of causation is of no concern in the simple conduct crimes; see also Beale, Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 632 (1920).
213. For details see GEERAL PRINCIPLES 224-7.
214. Strahorn, Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 491, 492 (1933).

2,15. Ibid.
216. So 7 WIGmoRE, EviDNc

401 (3d ed. 1940); similar MI.LER, ON CRIMINAL LAW

93 (1934). For CLARK & MARsRAIJ, op. cit. supra note 212, at 109, corpus delicti signifies
"the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained."
217. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 186, at 17; cf. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 224, 226.
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of a crime. For that reason, we can refer to what has already been said
about harm and its differentiation from the other required circumstances
of the crime-harm as limited to the protected interest, with corpus delicti
as the total of all definitional
elements of the crime necessary to bring
2 18
about the proscribed harm.
If corpus delicti is employed for purposes of procedural law as suggested by Hall,2 19 it loses its relation to the legal interests, for it is on a
different legal plane. Here, an identification of the two is no longer possible. In any case, harm and corpus delicti are not synonymous.
The reader of Hall's discourse on mens rea220 will realize that harm
plays a major role in its description. This is not surprising if one considers
that harm and mens rea are the polar components of the crime, i.e., harm
as the impairment of the objective legal order and the interests protected
by it and mens rea as the state of mind with which the harm was done.
Thus, harm proves to be the end which the evil mind tends to accomplish.
In this sense, harm and mens rea are the very principles around which
penal liability centers. It is no wonder that a comprehensive study of the
relationship between harm and mens rea reveals various connecting links
between them.
Because of the limited scope of this analysis, we must restrict our investigation to one basic aspect of that relationship, namely, the question
of whether mens rea is a necessary prerequisite of penal harm. This problem could also be called the question of the interdependence of harm and
mens rea. It is surprising that only Jerome Hall seems to have dealt with
this question, although not in any particular detail. In accordance with
his emphasis on mens rea as the pre-form of actual conduct, harm is said
to be dependent upon mens rea. Hall argues that, "since conduct, i.e.,
voluntary conduct, expresses and actualizes mens rea, it would be incor22
rect to assert that conduct but not mens rea is the cause of harm."
222
Therefore, "there being no mens rea, no harm was committed."
A proposition similar to Hall's had already been propagated by German
criminalists of the late nineteenth century when the controversy over the
distinction between objective unlawfulness and subjective guilt had
218. The problem of a difference between intangible harm and a tangible corpus delicti
troubled the court in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154 (1954) when it noticed that
in some crimes such as tax evasion "there is no tangible injury which can be isolated as a
corpus delicti." But still the court had to establish a corpus delicti as to the agency of the
defendant. Unfortunately the problem of the intangible harm in such crimes was apparently
not realized.
219. GENERAL PRnCI'LEs 227. Wingersky, too, recognizes the "procedural overtones" of
corpus delicti though finally applying it for purposes of substantive law, in CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 212, at 109.
220. GENERAL PRINCIPLES chs. III-IV.
221. See HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRI-INAL THEORY, 159 n.3.
222. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 236.
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reached its climax. 228 At that time, so prominent a legal thinker as Adolf

Merkel still espoused the opinion that there could be no unlawfulness
without guilt, with the consequence that an insane person, by nature, could
not be capable of causing criminal harm. The same conclusion was reached
by those who advocated the so-called theory of imperatives (Von Thon,
Ferneck, Graf Dohna). They believed that law was primarily a system
of commands and prohibitions which could only be addressed to those
capable of responding. Hence only people who had criminal capacity were
capable of performing illegal acts. As a result, the subjective capacity to
have mens rea was deemed a necessary prerequisite of criminal harm.
This theory, however, challenged by Von Liszt and Nagler, was substantially defeated when, three decades later, Edmund Mezger demonstrated
that the law, in addition to the function of charging and commanding
human beings, also has the task of evaluating and establishing norms for
objective conduct and situations concerning the social order.224 Since that
time, German criminal jurisprudence has made a fundamental distinction
between a judgment concerning objective unlawfulness, including the
presence of harm, and the subjective guilt of the perpetrator. Though both
must be present in order to render the proscribed conduct punishable,
each has its peculiar function independent of the other. Therefore, the
proof of unlawfulness is used to judge the deed or actus reus, but not the
personality of the perpetrator, which is only in question so far as personal
guilt is concerned. For this reason, German law can assume the presence
of an objective harm even in cases where subjective mens rea cannot be
proved. This assumption, therefore, establishes a right of self-defense
against those who, because of insanity, do not act with mens rea, for their
conduct is still harmful and unlawful.22 5
Although American jurisprudence is not bound to accept a principle
developed in another criminal system, it is, nevertheless, worthwhile to
consider its merits because the problem it seeks to solve is universal. Hall,
when holding that harm depends on mens rea, overlooks the fact that,
even though there is no crime without mens rea, there may well be harm
without proof of mens rea. Although evidence of a completed crime requires the judgment of the criminal act as a whole including the objective
side of the actus reus and the subjective state of mind of mens rea, harm
expresses only the notion that the human conduct in question has injured
or endangered certain legal interests. This requires, of course, that the
harmful conduct be voluntary. However, though the intellectual and
volitional elements of conduct may be part of mens rea, they do not con223. To this and the following see ROBERT VON HIPPEL, 2 DEUTSCHIES STRATRECET 183-"

186 (1930).
224. See MEzGER, STRAFRECHT, EiN LEHRBUCH, 163-167 (3d ed. 1949).
225. This is generally recognized today; cf. especially SCH6NKE-SCHR8DER, STRAFGESETZBuC H, KOmmENTAR 13, 329 et seq. (11th ed. 1963); MAURACH 232-3.
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stitute the complete mens rea. According to modern views (including
Hall's), mens rea is not merely another expression for intention, but requires subjective moral culpability 226 or at least the awareness of the
prohibited quality of the conduct. 2 7 This subjective appreciation of
wrongdoing can add nothing to the objective disvalue of the harm.
Since the primary function of law is not to prosecute certain evil minds
but to protect the legal order from infringements, this order is objectively
violated as soon as one of its recognized interests is voluntarily or otherwise imputably injured or endangered, regardless of the perpetrator's
frame of mind. Whether a man who did not know that his conduct was
wrongful is to be punished is another question which on principle should
be answered in the negative. Despite this, his conduct has proven harmful
socially as well as legally. 8
Furthermore, a logical objection may be raised against Hall's point of
view. While Hall makes harm dependent on mens rea, he employs harm
for determining the meaning of mens rea.22 9 Thus, is it not a vicious circle
to determine a subject by means of a factor which in turn is supposed to
be dependent upon the subject to be determined?
In summary, it is our understanding that mens rea, although an essential component of the crime, is not a prerequisite of criminal harm. Harm,
of course, does not render the actor punishable unless his mens rea is
proven. Nonetheless, both must be kept distinct: stated in general terms,
harm connotes the substance of the objective unlawfulness of the criminal
act, while mens rea comprises its subjective elements.
Harm-Its ConstitutionalEvaluation: The Value Aspect
of the Legal Interests
The preceding section was concerned with only the factual aspects of
harm. As discussed earlier, however, harm and legal interests as the objects of harm have a dualistic structure. The sociological factual substrata
of the legal interests are not legally protectable simply because they have
226. So Hall himself, cf. in particular his criticism of Holmes' theory of non-moral penal

liability, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES 146-170.
227. Cf. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225 (1957). Basic on this subject is Mueller, supra note 187. In his opinion intention
and recklessness are only "forms" of mens rea whereas its "substance" is characterized by
the consciousness of wrongdoing.
228. The examples discussed by HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 230-32 support the writer's

contention that Hall did not clearly differentiate between the forms of mens rea and its substance. It cannot be denied that in many crimes some form of mens rea must be present in
order to make certain conduct harmful; so, taking a woman over state lines will not be a
harm unless done for purposes of prostitution or debauchery, etc. But if so performed, isn't

that harm accomplished even if the perpetrator did not know that his conduct was criminal?
229. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 72: "Two

factors determine

the meaning of mens rea-an

actual harm and the mental state of the actor who voluntaily commits it."
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value for some persons or social groups; rather, they must be of "legal"
value because the state is the representation of the whole people. It may,
therefore, provide protection only for those interests which, from the
legal point of view, are worth protecting. Therefore, a sociological interest
must always correspond to a legal value in order to be protected as a legal
interest. This is precisely what is meant by the dualistic structure of legal
interests. The sociologically grounded interest is but one side; it must be
complemented by a legally recognized value-the factual interest has to
be normatively evaluated by the law. This is not a novelty; courts have
always decided in this manner, although not aware of it. Interests can
never claim legal protection merely because they are interests per se, and
the fact that an individual feels harmed does not make the injury a criminal harm.
This principle was clearly stated in the Connecticut case of Taylor v.
Keefe.3 There, Art. 1, § 12 of the Connecticut Constitution guaranteed
redress "for any injury done" to the plaintiff. Against its plain wording,
"any injury" was interpreted and restricted to mean "a legal injury, that
is, one violative of an established law of which a court can properly take
2 32
cognizance." ' ' Also, the decision in Richard v. Carpenter,
though not
a yardstick for valuation, emphasizes the need for weighing and balancing
the interests to be protected in order to reach a just result. Similar views
can be found in Dean Pound's jurisprudence of interests. Although the
interests are not created by law, they have to be recognized and adjusted
by the law.233
Why do such interests need legal recognition? We have already suggested that the government, as the representative of all the people; may
not be partial to one group and, therefore, may only protect interests
which are worthy of general cognizance. This is not the complete answer,
however: there are other reasons which require a limitation on the government's penal power. At first sight, it might appear more humanitarian
if the state protected the wishes of any of its citizens. However, the effect
of such generosity would be a corresponding restriction of individual freedom of activity, because the individual interest in universal freedom and
the community's interest in a maximum of security are never in so antithetical a tension as they are in criminal law.
It is well known that every criminal prohibition or command auto230. 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
231. Ibid. Similar interpretations of Montana Constit. in Stewart v. Standard Publ. Co.,
102 Mont. 43, 49, 55 P.2d 694 (1936) and of Pennsylvania Constit. in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 168, 106 Ati. 238 (1919).
232. Carpenter, The Problem of Value Judgments as Norms of Law, 7 J. LEGAL ED.
163, 167 (1954).
233. Cf. Powers, Some Reflections on Pound's Jurisprudence of Interests, 3 CATHOLIC
U.L. Ray. 10, 15 (1953).
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matically results in the restriction of free activity and personal liberty,
not to mention the danger of one easily becoming criminally liable and
thereby losing liberty, property, and reputation. As the number of interests protected by the criminal law increases, the sphere of personal initiative shrinks. This necessitates the balancing of the interest which longs
for protection against the loss of individual freedom which a criminal
prohibition might bring. At this point, it becomes obvious that not all
interests, however valuable they may be for one man or another, deserve
criminal protection. Individual freedom is too highly valued to be sacrificed to any peculiar demands or desires. For this reason an interest, in
order to deserve protection, must be grounded on a broader basis than
that of the welfare of a single individual or a particular class; it must
have the recognition of society. This does not mean that individual interests may not be recognized as a matter of principle-this is clearly evidenced by the protection of life, private property, and many other individual goods. It means instead that an interest, be it that of an individual,
of a social group, or of the state, must have the express or tacit approval
of the public at large. In other words, society must deem it valuable
enough to safeguard, though it may be of direct benefit to only certain
individuals or special groups in the community.
This is a fundamental. principle of any criminal law which attempts to
achieve an equitable balance between the individual interest in freedom
and the social and state interest in maximum security. To force one's own
interests upon the criminal legislation of a country at the expense of other
individuals has always been a sign of dictatorship. In a democratic order,
however, a group must be ready to struggle for the social protection of
its peculiar interests, and the government will not grant legal protection
at the cost of individual freedom if the interests are only of insignificant
social use.
Fortunately, our courts have always held that the power of criminal
legislation must be exercised in social responsibility, i.e., with due respect
to truly general needs, therefore refusing protection to all demands which
were of purely private significance." 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court
in State v. Ballance23 5 presented this very problem:
An exertion of the police power inevitably results in a limitation
of personal liberty, and legislation in this field is justified only
on the theory that the social interest is paramount. In exercising
234. Cf. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12
Cal.2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938); Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App. 2d 161, 70 P.2d 962, 967
(1937); State v. Mitchell, 217 N.C. 244, 7 S.E.2d 567, 571 (1940). Also, 11 Am. J-u.
Constitutional Law § 274 (1937). See also infra IV on the evaluation of public welfare
offenses.
235. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
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this power, the legislation must have in view the good of the citizen as a whole rather than the interests of a particular class.
Likewise, for Professor Snyder, 3 6 the imposition of penal liability is a
question of balancing the interests. The preponderant weight is, however,
the public interest.
So far we have discussed the social recognition of the interests to be
protected and, indeed, this is a major step in processing an interest before
it reaches full criminal protection. A social interest must be developed
since, at first, it is the private concern of some individuals or a particular
class. Nonetheless, since other members of the community would never
restrict their liberty in favor of an interest of limited significance, the
237
interest which is a private concern must be promoted to a social interest.
Consequently, the picture of the legally protected interests is always
changing. Each era of social evolution elevates new desires and needs,
while others lose their former importance. 3 8
Many private interests fail at the stage of social recognition. If, for
example, an individual wants a newspaper publisher to use a better grade
of printer's ink in order to keep the linen clean when the individual is
reading in bed, perhaps one day he may find a majority of the community
which considers this desire so valuable as to protect it by forcing newspaper publishers to use a cleaner print. As long as such social approval
is not forthcoming, however, legal recognition and, thus, criminal sanction
is not justified. In other words, demands and desires which are inconsistent
with general concepts of the time and place do not receive immediate consideration by the legal order.3 9 In this case, they fail before the most
important step, namely, that from social to legal recognition.
The social recognition of an interest is a process of social evolution
alone. Although society at large may determine that certain interests merit
protection, legal recognition does not necessarily follow. Social and legal
concepts and standards can be quite divergent. A survey of cases in which
criminal provisions were invalidated demonstrates many examples wherein
the invalidation was based on lack of a protectable interest or an interest
which was inconsistent with superior demands and needs. This brings us
236. SNYDER, PREFACE TO JURISPRUDENCE 521 (1954).
237. To this and the following section cf. ALBN ESER, DIE ABGRENZUNG VON STRAFrATm

tND ORDNuNGSWiDRIGKEiTE 87-88 (Dissertation at Wiirzburg University Library 1961).
238. This dependence of criminal wrongs on the attitude of the respective community
was recently commented on in State v. Western Union, 13 N.J. Super. 172, 80 A.2d 342,
361: "The concept of public wrong is the product of social evolution and whether an act
has been or is deemed to be a public injury or menace depends on the stage of civilization
and the conditions which confront a people."
239. Cf. Pound, The End of Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914); Powers, supra
note 233.
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to a consideration of the values to which an interest must correspond in
order to achieve recognition as a legal interest.
Obviously, legal recognition, on principle, can only be based on law. 4 '
If there is an interest which has been socially recognized, such as the
interest in freedom against wiretapping, the first step in legal evaluation
would be to ascertain whether this specific value fits into any existing
order of legal interests. This statement is based on observations made
particularly by the German criminalists Thomas Wiirtenberger24 ' and
Dietrich Oehler.2 42 Both, investigating the value concepts of past and
present penal codes, have discovered that penal codes, besides being an
accumulation or conglomeration of provisions for certain behaviors, have
a normative function. They constitute a system of values and convictions
which a society at a certain cultural stage deems necessary to preserve.
Such a legal order regularly embodies a system of values which can be
used as a means for evaluating new interests proposed for legal recognition. If they fit into this system, they can be recognized as legal interests
worthy of criminal protection. However, not all new demands and needs
can be measured according to the values of an already existing legal order.
The development of modern public welfare legislation produced a great
flow of new desires conditioned by developments of technology, industrialization, and a new way of life. Within this field there is no possibility of
relating back to a preexistent penal order; the legislature can no longer
rely on values already embodied in the traditional penal code. Therefore,
the legislature must assume a creative role in establishing new norms and
values demanded by society.
In this search for new standards, however, the question arises as to the
power of the legislature to establish such norms. Is it completely free to
recognize new interests and demands by advancing the penal value system
to horizons and peaks previously unknown? At this point the Constitution
must be brought into play. Since Marbury v. Madison,2 43 it has been
understood that the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land" and
that laws repugnant to it are void. This principle extends to all legislative
acts and, therefore, is pertinent to penal legislation. The courts have
always emphasized that the legislature, in spite of its broad police power,
must keep within its constitutional restraints. 44 Thus, as far as the penal
240. Insofar we cannot follow Dean Pound when he suggests the basing of the recognition of values only on the attitude of the society; cf. the criticism by Powers, supra note
233, at 10-26.
241. WURTENBERGER, DAS SYSTEM DER RECHTSGUTERORDNUNO IN DER DEUTSCHEN STRAFGESETZGEBUNG (1933).
242. WURZEL, WANDEL UND WERT DER STRAFREcHTLIcHEN LECALORDNUNG

2, 202

(1950).

243. 1 Cranch 138, 5 U.S. 368 (1803).

244. See State v. Western Union, supra note 238, at 361: "The state is invested, by
virtue of its police power, . . .with a large measurement of discretion in the creation and
definition of criminal offenses. The power is, of course, subject to constitutional restraints,
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system of values is concerned, the Constitution is the basis of the entire
legal order.245
What are the consequences of this principle? This restraint simply requires criminal provisions, which would effect the legal recognition of
new social interests, to be in harmony with the Constitution. Only interests
which are within the constitutional framework of recognized rights and
interests may receive protection by criminal sanctions. Whether such constitutional recognition is present is not always easily determined: the
Constitution guarantees only a small number of values. In any case, however, the number of protectable interests is greater than the rights which
are expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Like a penal code, the Constitution is the expression of a certain order of values. Its principles, statements, and policies constitute an integrated system of the basic beliefs of
society and state. Unlike the penal order, however, the constitutional order
of values contains generally defined rights, demands, and liberties. As was
recently demonstrated in a study of criminal administration by Professor
Walter Sax, 2 " the function of the constitutional value order is basically
different from that of the penal order. The constitutional order is embodied in principles which constitute the "abstract frame" for all legislative activity, whereas the penal order of legal interests is more concretely formed and oriented toward interests frequently injured by
unlawful attacks.24 7 For example, in murder, human life is protected only
against certain types of injuries, namely, homicide committed with malice
aforethought. Other types of homicide, i.e., manslaughter, abortion, etc.,
have different sanctions. Similar variations could be found in other crime
groups having a like main value while the crime provisions are directed
against different aspects of that value. In larceny, for example, personal
property is protected against being unlawfully carried away. The legal
interest therein involved is primarily the proprietary right of the possessor,2 4 8 whereas in larceny by false pretenses, the owner is protected against
representations with the
willingly giving away his property upon false
legal interests of ownership being included. 249 These few examples are
and its exercise needs be reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious." Cf. also State v. Ballance, supra note 235; Carter v. State, 243 Ala. 575, 11 So. 2d 766 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ; De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also SNYDER, Op. cit. supra note 209, at 759-64.
245. With reference to the constitution as the fundament of the legal order in general
see CARL J. FRIEDRICH, DIE PHILOSOPH. DEs REcHTS iN HISTORISCHER PERSPEKTIVE ch.
XXIII (1955).
246. Sax, Grundsatze der Strajrechtspflege, in BETrERmANN-NIPPERDEY-SCHEUNER, 3(2)
Di. Gau-xRMcTE 911-913 (1959).
247. Id. at 912.
248. Cf. PERKiqs 195.
249. Cf. id. at 249-51. See also Perkins' introduction to the acquisitive offenses at 18790; it is proof of the fact that the legal interests are in steady flow. Though property as
such always was a recognized interest, it took a while to gain the protection it has today.
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sufficient to show that the penal order is much more differentiated with
regard to its interests than is the constitutional value order.
The values positively enumerated in the Constitution are few in number. They are, however, values of wide range and scope. They do not
require more differentiation for, as mentioned above, the Constitution has
a function different from that of a penal order. The Constitution, in general, has only a negative function: it describes the frame within which
new interests can reach constitutional, and, thus, legal interests. Naturally,
that does not mean that the interest seeking recognition must correspond
to, or must not contravene, an expressly declared constitutional provision.
Rather, it is required that the interest fit within the broad framework of
values which are embodied and carried by the constitutional spirit. The
same conclusion was reached by Professor Snyder. In discussing the
limitations of the legislative power to make certain conduct criminal,2 5 °
he suggested that we should not look for a particular constitutional pro251
vision "but something which is the spirit or sum total of all of them."2
The Constitution of the United States has a very broad and general
framework of values due to the dynamic due process clause and the wide
scope of liberty and property rights. In addition, those crimes which were
already known when the Constitution was adopted and the legal interests
of which, therefore, were tacitly incorporated into the corpus and spirit
of the constitutional value order must be considered. It would, of course,
go beyond the scope of this paper to describe the scheme of the constitutional value system in full detail. In the analysis to follow, we shall give
some examples, most of them decided by American courts, in which it
was doubtful that the interests protected in a criminal provision were in
harmony with the Constitution. First, a reflection on some interests which
are either positively expressed by the Constitution or which are commonly
recognized as consistent with it is required. Second, a description of some
interests which, in spite of being constitutionally recognized, cannot be
criminally protected because their protection would contravene other
higher constitutional interests or rights will follow. The third section shall
deal with problems of modern welfare legislation. This presents an oppor250. SNYDER, Op. cit. supra note 209, at 760.
251. Cf. also Elmer M. Million, Limitations on the Enforceability of Criminal Sanctions, 28 GEo. L.J. 464 (1940). Dealing with the question of what constitutes a crime, what
types of conduct can be made subject to criminal sanctions, and what persons can be treated
as criminals, Million makes some surprising discoveries. Surveying numerous court decisions,
he found that in some cases the scope of crimes was not only limited by means of constitutional provisions such as due process, but that even in the absence of constitutional prohibitions statutes were declared void where they infringed upon what was deemed a natural,
inherent, inviolable, inalienable, common, vested, or reserved right. Though I doubt whether
such a dangerous extension of the "constitutional spirit" can be fully supported, at any rate
it shows that the constitutional provisions never should be considered alone but in the
context of the whole integrative order the constitution is propounding.
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tunity to report on the impact and significance of the newly developed
utility and necessity principle.
The criminal protection of rights and interests which are expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution presents no great difficulties, e.g., the
protection of life in homicide crimes, the body in assault and battery,
house and home against burglary and arson, property against different
forms of larceny, embezzlement, robbery, forgery, extortion. As previously
mentioned, the reference to property, life, etc., denotes only the main
value of those crimes. The individual crime type usually selects one of
the many interests which are related to the main value. It is not always
easy to determine the specific interest which the respective provision seeks
to prevent. In addition, a combination of two or more interests constitutes
the real substance of a crime in some cases. For example, in robbery, the
unlawful attack is not only directed against property interests but also
against the possessor's freedom and integrity.2 52 With larceny by false
pretenses, too, it can become quite difficult to tell which of the many
forms of property rights are included within the scope of the crime. For
25
example, by analyzing United States v. Rubinstein,
Snyder2 5 4 proved
that the crime of false pretenses protects not only the monetary interests
of the defrauded party, but also his proprietary interest in being safe
against deceit. 5 5 Another crime in which the legal interest involved is
rather complex is that of common law extortion, i.e., the corrupt collection
of an unlawful fee by an officer under color of office.25 6 Even though the
provision is primarily designed to protect citizens' property against undue
demands of a public official,2 57 it also must prevent "abuse of public in252. Cf. PERKiNS 236.

253. 7 U.S.C.MA. 523, 22 C.M.R. 313 (1957). In this case the defendant, while serving
as a club manager in a Japanese U.S. air base, purchased whiskey from importers on the
false representation that the beverage was to be used in the normal operations of the club.
But actually the defendant bought it for a Japanese black market syndicate, thus evading
the payment of high Japanese import duties. If they had known this, the importers would
not have sold to the defendant since their license would have been revoked for violation of
special license regulations. Defendant was convicted of larceny by false pretenses "notwithstanding the fact that the seller suffered no pecuniary loss since the seller bargained not only
for the money but also for a legal sale which did not endanger his license."
254. Snyder, False Pretenses-Harmto Person From Whom Thing Obtained, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 34, 48 (1957).
255. Similarly also FRANK, STRAFGEsETZBUcH § 263 I (18th ed. 1931) as for the German
law. But according to the now prevailing opinion in Germany the legal interest of "Betrug,"
the crime comparable to false pretenses, is the property and only the property, see SCE6NKESCER8DnR, op. cit. supra note 225, § 263, I. Dissenting is MEzGER, STRAFRECHT, BEsoNDERER
TmiL 164 (6th ed. 1958) who wants to have included the maintenance of truth and bona fide
in the economic life.
256. See PERKiNS 319.
257. Therefore, it is properly listed with the offenses against property, see PERKINS,

ibid.
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Therefore, both interests make up the full substance of that

crime.259
Of those legal interests which are not expressly specified by the Constitution but which were commonly recognized at the time the Constitution was adopted, it is necessary to mention here only the protection of
state and government against treacherous and subversive activities, the
administration of governmental functions against perjury, bribery and
contempt, the protection of sexual life against rape and other offenses
against morality and decency. Thus, all of the interests protected in the
traditional common law of crimes, in so far as they did not become obsolete in the last century, can be considered part of the constitutional value
system.
Since the early days of the Constitution, many new social needs and
wants have arisen. Science and industrialization have made tremendous
progress, but their welcome fruits have also created dangers to individual
life and liberty and social security. They marked the commencement of
an irresistible flow of modern criminal legislation, which, even today,
continues to add to an already vast number of so-called public welfare
offenses. This movement, of course, would not have been possible without
the social and legal recognition of those newly discovered goods and
interests.
Not all demands, however, have successfully achieved legal stature.
In a number of cases, courts have declared statutes void when the new
interests to be criminally protected were held inconsistent with the Constitution. On the whole, this period of public welfare legislation has
brought a huge increase in new legal interests and, thus, a steady complementing and expanding of the framework of the constitutional value order.
Without pretending to be exhaustive, we might present some of these
newly recognized legal interests. Among the interests which are of a more
general nature and which can be threatened and injured from many sides
are those of the public health, morals and general welfare. These interests
were recognized in 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas,6 ° or shortly thereafter in
258. 4 BLACKSTONE, ComsEIerARIEs *141.

259. In these cases of one or more interests, however, an interesting terminological question arises. Professor Mueller, who comprehends harm as a three-level abstraction (see 34
IND. L.J. 220 and supra II, seems to suggest that the special or secondary interest of a crime
should be put on the third, i.e., the special harm level so as to contrast it to the main interest of the intermediate harm level. Though the secondary interest of a crime often gives that
crime its distinctive character and, thus, can be considered as its special interest, we nevertheless would not put the fundamental and the special interests on different harm levels since
both together are constituent parts of the same crime and, thus only together make up the
full substance of that crime. Cf. also MAURACH 173.
260. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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State v. Gilman,2 6' State v. Redmon2 62 and Miller v. Board of Public
Works.2"' In State v. Ballance264 the criminal statute is said "to promote
the accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a
public harm." In different language, Mr. Justice Holmes declared that
the police power extends "to all the great public needs. It may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare." '2 5
These general interests naturally can and must be broken down into
specific interests-that of public safety into the security of traffic,266 the
security of driving without distraction by advertising signs,267 that of
public health into protection against overcrowded tenements and unhealthy slums, the requirement of removal and collection of garbage, or
vaccination and segregation of infectious patients. 6 Another well-settled
criterion is the preservation and protection of public morals.26 9 Therefore,
it is of legal interest to suppress gambling and houses of prostitution27
or to prohibit association with prostitutes. 17 ' However, certain areas are
not protected, such as religious convictions regarding rest on Sundays. 2
Other modern wants which are held to be part of the general welfare and
therefore worth protecting are the "well-being and tranquility" of city
dwellers against broadcasts of public interest amplified to a loud and
raucous volume by sound trucks2 73 and standards of a community against
the creation of business establishments in certain residential areas. 4
Likewise, the civic and social values of the American home are protected
by establishing strictly residential zones.27 5
As to interests which cannot be categorized as welfare offenses, we
should mention, in particular, the state's interest in self-preservation
against advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government. 76 Also
261. 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889).
262. 134 Wis. 89, 114 N.W. 137 (1907).
263. 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
264. Supra note 235.
265. Noble State Bank v. Haskall, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
266. Cf. Kovacs v. Copper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
267. Cf. State v. Blackburn, 104 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1958).
268. For details see 11 Am. JUR. ConstitutionalLaw § 270 (1937).
269. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914).
270. Barbour v. State, 146 Ga. 667, 92 S.E. 70 (1917).
271. State v. McCormick, 142 La. 580, 77 So. 288 (1917).
272. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
273. Supra note 266.
274. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941); Merritt v.
Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953).
275. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925).
276. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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important are those interests which are offsprings of the old liberty rights.
A rather extensive statement of these was rendered in Meyer v. Nebraska.2 7 In Meyer, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
McReynolds, declared that the liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, without doubt, not only denoted freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
This is, indeed, a very comprehensive list of valuable interests, but it is
a practical question in criminal administration whether all can be effectively protected by criminal sanctions. Yet, as mentioned before, the
courts did not accede to all legislative recognitions of new interests. The
following are some of the cases in which the courts invalidated criminal
provisions because the interests concerned were not held to merit protection by penal sanctions.
In Carter v. State,278 an Alabama statute provided that
any person, firm, corporation or association of persons who,
without a just cause or legal excuse, wilfully or wantonly does
any act with the intent or with reason to believe that such act
will injure, interfere with, hinder, delay, or obstruct any lawful
business or enterprise in which persons employed for wages...
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute, the purpose of which would amount to a total protection of
businessmen against any jeopardy through competitors, was held invalid
because of a legislative abuse of police power. In a case in which a revenue
regulation was capable of being construed so as to protect liquor prohibition interests, the court forbade such construction because, since the
repeal of the 18th amendment, liquor prohibition interests were no longer
protectable interests.2 79 In State v. Varsalona,2 0 the defendant had been
convicted of arson because he had burned down his own liquor store
despite any injury to anyone else. The conviction was reversed on the
ground that the legislature, when prohibiting the wilful burning of any
shop or storehouse, could not have intended to outlaw any wilful burning
of property irrespective of ownership or any other circumstances. In
Lovell v. City of Griffin,2 8' the court refused to recognize the city's interest
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
243 Ala. 575, 11 So. 2d 766 (1943).
Wisniewski v. United States, 247 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1957).
309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958).
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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in licensing the distribution of any pamphlet. In Eidge v. City of Bessemer,28 2 the court invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited the keeping of intoxicating liquors and beverages in any quantity and for any purpose, however innocent; nor did California's attempt to prevent racial
tension and unhappy offspring through a miscegenation statute find judicial approval. In Perez v. Lippold,28" a statute which penalized marriages
of white persons to Negroes, Mongolians and Malayans was invalidated
on the ground that it deprived citizens of the liberty of marriage "without
serving any proper end," thus refusing the prevention of racial tension
and unhappy offspring recognition as an interest worth criminal protection. Whereas, in all the cases listed, the interests put forward for protection were not illegal per se, this survey will be concluded with an
example in which the respective statute would have served illegal purposes,
namely, the promotion of a monopoly. In State v. Ballance,284 a criminal
command requiring any photographer for hire to have a license was held
invalid since it tended "to promote a monopoly in what is essentially a
private business."
Whereas the foregoing cases reflect interests sanctioned by statute but
refused legal recognition by the reviewing courts because they were held
not worthy of criminal protection, the following cases are those in which
interests, though recognizable as such, were denied recognition because
their protection would be detrimental to other higher constitutional interests or rights. Most cases of this kind appear in connection with the
right to equal protection, the principle of due process, freedom of religion,
and other civil rights.
As to freedom of religion, the government's interest in reverence towards the flag was forced to give way to religious beliefs. In West Virginia
2 85
State Board of Education v. Barnette,
a state statute requiring school
children to salute the flag on pain of criminal punishment of the parents
was not enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to do so on
religious grounds. Again, in Hennington v. Georgia,286 the interests of
interstate commerce were held inferior to the protection of rest on Sundays. On the other hand, in Henderson v. Antonacci,27 general freedom
of activity was considered superior to religious beliefs which forbade
Sunday labor. In this case, the court held that religious tenets, precepts,
or beliefs may be considered only "in so far as they furnish a guide for
good public morals or health." In Reynolds v. United States, 2 8 religious
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

164 Ala. 599, 51 So. 246 (1909).
32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
163 U.S. 299 (1896).
Supra note 272.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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convictions also failed to succeed. There the defendant, a Mormon, had
married twice on the religious belief that it was the duty of the male members of the Mormon Church to practice polygamy even though it was
criminally prohibited. Since marriage, in a monogamous form, is a fundamental social institution and a most important feature of social life, the
court held that it must be protected even against opposing religious
demands.
Turning to civil liberties and property rights, we find some cases where
these rights were protected even against liquor prohibition interests, when
the latter were excessive or amounted to a complete disregard of basic
civil rights." 9 That the statute violated the guaranteed right to liberty,
the enjoyment of the fruits of one's own labor, and the pursuit of happiness was, as previously mentioned, one of the grounds for invalidation in
State v. Ballance' 90 In other cases, the state's interests in self-preservation were not recognized when they were repugnant to civil rights, such
2 9' a statute foras freedom of speech. Thus in Stromberg v. California,
bidding the display of a red flag as a sign of opposition to the organized
government was held inconsistent with freedom of speech.292
Finally, there are cases where statutes, although protecting interests
which were legal per se, were invalidated because of violation of the equal
protection clause. In People v. Bowen,2 98 a statute required sightseeing
guides for New York City to have a license which was granted only to
those who had been residents of New York for two years prior to the
application. The court found that this discrimination between residents
and non-residents had no reasonable basis, and was not, therefore, reconcilable with the principle of equality." 4 In State v. Blackburn,295 a statute
requiring gasoline price signs to be of a certain size and at a certain distance from the road was held void because it was discriminatorily imposed
upon one specific class of retailers. Also, the previously mentioned miscegenation statute in Perez v. Lippold 96 was declared unconstitutional, not
only because it did not serve any proper end, but also because it unduly
discriminated against certain races. These cases are adequate proof of
289. Cf. State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 61 S.E. 61 (1908); Eidge v. City of Bessemer,

supra note 282; State v. Gilman, supra note 261; in these cases general reference to the
privileges and immunities of the citizens. But see also Mugler v. Kansas, supra note 260,
where a liquor prohibition law was held consistent with the 14th amendment.
290. See supra note 284. Another ground of its invalidation was the observation that it

promoted illegal interests. Cf. also Town of Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1955).
291. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
292. Cf. also De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 244.
293. 175 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1958).
294. See also Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1941); Schrager v. City
of Albany, 197 Misc. 903, 99 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1950).
295. Supra note 267.
296. See supra note 283.
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the fact that the existence of a social harm, likely to be caused by certain
activities, does not necessarily suffice to justify criminal sanctions. Individual and social interests must be constitutionally evaluated; if they are
not repugnant to any higher interests, they can obtain criminal protection.
As mentioned earlier, the traditional law of crimes in the last century
was enveloped by a steadily increasing number of public welfare offenses.
This resulted from the fact that the sociological structure and the social
aims of the modern state, society, and economy required sanctions for
the protection of public health, safety, and general welfare. As is quite
natural for hasty developments, the legislature occasionally exceeded its
limits and virtually prohibited activities which were not harmful at all
or it passed measures which were ineffective to prevent the harm. In the
face of such circumstances, the courts finally interceded; the principle
they generally employed for controlling the efficiency and reasonableness
of such statutes was that of utility and necessity. Professor Scott seems
to have been the first to call attention to it.297 A likewise intensive consideration was given it by Mueller, who appraised it in connection with
Hall's general principles of criminal law.2 98
To be sure, not all courts accept this principle. Some take the position
that it is not the function of the judiciary to eliminate unnecessary and
inefficient criminal provisions. In United States v. Kissinger,299 the Third
Circuit Court held: ".

.

. whether a particular statutory enactment under

the commerce clause is reasonably necessary is not for the court to determine." Also, in People v. Adler,"°° the court denied its jurisdiction to
inquire into the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of legislation which is
the sole affair of the legislature; the court, nevertheless, determined
whether there was "any rational basis" for the conclusion that the regulations in question served a health purpose. °1
On the whole, courts seem increasingly inclined to invalidate criminal
regulations if they are completely unnecessary or useless. However, there
are various considerations on which the utility scrutiny is based. In Nebbia
v. New York, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be obtained." ' 2 The New Jersey Superior Court demands a "reasonable
297. Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 Rocxy MT. L.
Rlv. 275, 280-83 (1957).
298. 34 IND. L.J. 206, 224 (1959).
299. 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958).
300. 177 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1958). See also Defiance Milk Product Co. v. Du Mond, 309
N.Y. 537, 540, 132 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1956).
301. Mueller, too, seems to have doubts if a judicial utility scrutiny should be generally
recognized. But in face of the present practice of the lawmakers he would not deny the
courts the right to doublecheck on legislative wisdom; see supra note 298, at 225.
302. 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
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relation to one of the needs which gives rise to the exercise of police
power. ' Other courts speak of "rational relation ' 13°4 or that the regulation must be "necessary to the common good ' 30 5 or "reasonably necessary to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the people of a community." ' 6 Likewise, the references which are made
to certain constitutional provisions are divergent. Some cases simply do
not refer to the Constitution at all,3" 7 or in general reference they rely
on "the privileges and immunities of the citizens. ' 38 Other cases resort
to the equal protection clause. 0 9 Nonetheless, in most cases, the lack of
utility or reasonable necessity of a regulation was held inconsistent with
the due process clause. 10 This, indeed, seems to be the best ground for
invalidating unnecessary and inefficient criminal provisions. If the conduct prohibited is practically harmless or if the provision cannot prevent
the harm in any event, it makes little sense to deprive the violator of his
life or property. The imposition of a sanction in such a case is not con31 1
sistent with the principle of due process.
Perhaps we should also consider the utility and necessity principle from
the standpoint of criminal jurisprudence. Our contention, that criminal
law and punishment should be engaged only where it is useful and efficient,
is a conviction almost as old as criminal law itself, although it must be
conceded that powerful rulers have found it hard to resist the natural
temptation to exaggerate their fight against real or imagined evils. Cesare
Beccaria, in particular, demanded the sparing of penalties as much as
possible. 2 In recent years, the Canadian scholar, R. S. Mackay,313 and
the German criminalist, Walter Sax,31 4 have emphasized that criminal
measures are only justified if the conduct to be prevented can and ought
to be deterred by penal sanctions. 315 Also, Professor Million deems stat303. State v. Western Union, 13 N.J. Super. 172, 80 A.2d 342 (1951).

304. State v. Blackburn, supra note 267.
305. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., supra note 274.
306. Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra note 263.
307. Wisniewski v. United States, supra note 279; State v. Varsalona, supra note 280.
308. State v. Gilman, supra note 261.
309. People v. Bowen, supra note 293; Henderson v. Antonacci, supra note 272.
310. State v. Blackburn, supra note 267; State v. Williams, supra note 289; Town of
Miami Springs v. Scoville, supra note 290; People v. Arlen Service Stations, 284 N.Y. 340,
31 N.E.2d 184 (1940); Nebbia v. New York, supra note 302; see also Mugler v. Kansas,
supra note 260; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
311. Cf. the interpretation of the due process clause in 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 567 (1956): the due process clause "is interpreted to mean that the government is without
right to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property by an act that has no reasonable relation to any proper governmental purpose, or which is so far beyond the necessity of the
case as to be an arbitrary exercise of governmental power."
312. Cf. VON BAR, 1

HANDBUCH

DEs DEUTSCHxN STRAFRECHTs 332 (1882).

313. In his reflections on the New Canadian Criminal Code, 12 TORONTO U.L.J. 206, 210
(1957/58).
314. SAx, op. cit. supra note 246, at 924-26.
315. See also ESER, Op. cit. supra note 237, at 149-51.
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utes which seem unnecessary or which do not bear a definite relationship
to an object the law might be directed against as not being worth criminal
enforcement. 16 In view of these authorities, it is to be hoped that more
and more courts will have the courage to invalidate criminal regulations'
the enforcement of which would be either useless or unnecessary.
Even though courts do not usually adjudicate on the basis of this distinction, it seems both possible and helpful to divide the utility and necessity principle into two main doctrines. According to this distinction, a
criminal provision is not in harmony with the requirements of utility and
necessity if:
1. the conduct prohibited does not have any real or substantial relation
to one of the purposes of public welfare legislation, or
2. the criminal provision employed to prevent a harm to one of those
interests is, in effect, not capable of accomplishing the protection for
which it was enacted.
A case in which the supposed effect of a prohibited behavior on public
morals was denied was St. Louis v. Fitz. 17 Here, a statute made it criminal "to knowingly associate with persons having the reputation of being
thieves and prostitutes." The court, however, did not find a harm substantial enough to be criminally sanctioned. In Meyer v. Nebraska,"'5
where a teacher was forbidden to teach modern languages, the court denied the contention that public welfare interests would necessarily be
harmed by the teaching of modern languages. In State v. Williams, 19 all
persons were prohibited "from carrying into the County of Burke, in any
day, more than one-half gallon of vinous, spiritous, or malt liquor." The
court found that this provision had no reasonable, substantial relation to
the sale of liquor as prohibited by law. 2 ° Cases in which restrictions upon
advertising signs were held unconstitutional since they had no detrimental
effect upon and bore no reasonable relation to public safety, health, morals,
or welfare are those of Levy v. City of Pontiac,2 State v. Miller322 and
Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations' Ass'n v. Brock. 3
We turn now to a discussion of cases wherein criminal provisions,
though directed against harmful activities, were not efficient means of
preventing the harm. For that reason, an ordinance aimed at curbing
316. Million, supra note 251, at 477, 480.
317. 53 Mo.582 (1873).
318. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
319. Supra note 289.
320. Similar Eidge v. City of Bessemer, supra note 282; State v. Gilman, supra note 261.
321. 331 Mich. 100, 49 N.W.2d 80 (1951).
322. 126 Conn. 373, 12 A.2d 192 (1940). But see Slome v. Godley, 304 Mass. 187, 23
N.E.2d 133 (1939), and Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Division of Necessaries of Life, 319
Mass. 301, 65 N.E.2d 529 (1946) where similar restrictions were upheld.
323. 109 Cal. App. 2d 698, 241 P.2d 597 (1952).
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juvenile delinquency was held invalid in Alves v. Justice's Court,324 since
it punished minors for violation of curfew laws even if they were innocently engaged. In Illinois, a statute aimed at the protection of public
safety, which made it a crime for a person to have the reputation of
carrying concealed weapons or of being a habitual law violator, was held
void in People v. Belcastro 25 In Regal Oil Co. v. State, 26 a statute required gasoline price signs of a certain size to be placed on the pump and
prohibited display of such signs on any other portion of the property. It
was held unconstitutional since there was no proof that signs of this size
in fact prevented fraud, dishonesty, or deceit of the public. 27 In State
v. Ballance,3 21 all professional photographers were required to have a
license which was in part conditioned on good moral character. The court
denied the statute's efficiency to promote the ends proposed and declared
that it was neither necessary nor useful to investigate a photographer's
mental or moral capacity before granting the license.
At first sight, it may not have been clearly understood why the principle
of utility was dealt with in connection with and in relation to the value
aspect of legal interests. Is there a real relationship between them? Is not
the utility idea a purely constitutional concept? It is, to be sure; precisely
because of its constitutional character, however, it is also of significance
for the normative evaluation of legal interests. It has been shown that
legal interests are, at first, individual or social goods and they must then
be constitutionally evaluated. Thus, they can only be legally recognized
(and in this way criminally protected) if they are in harmony with the
constitutional system of values. In this process of constitutional scrutiny;
the utility principle is just one of the means employed to secure the
integrity and functioning of the value order. It must safeguard the constitutional values from abuse by criminal provisions which in reality have
no reasonable relation to those values. Thus, the utility principle is
indeed capable of preventing the protection of interests which actually
are not worthy of being protected. In this way, it is one of the guarantees
of a proper constitutional evaluation of legal interests.
IV.

THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF HARM:
THE CONSEQUENCES

The Definition of the "Legal Interest" and of "Harm"
After having analyzed the nature and structure of harm from its different aspects, an attempt can be made to achieve a compact but comprehensive definition of the concept and its component parts. Remembering
324.
325.
326.
327.

148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957).
356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495 (1939).
Similar State v. Blackburn, supra note 267.

328. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
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the various misunderstandings and misconceptions to which the notion of
penal harm has been exposed, we must keep in mind some caveats.
On the one hand, the definition of harm must be made broad enough to
comprise all types of criminal harms, the harms of larceny and murder as
well as the harms of tax crimes or welfare offenses. Although the gravity
and significance of various harms may be different, they are similar as
far as their nature and structure are concerned. This is also true with
regard to crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita. Though the degree
of their social impact may be essentially different, the nature of their
harm is alike: all contain an element of danger to or destruction of some
legal interest.
On the other hand, harm must not be defined too generally. As we have
demonstrated, harm is more than the mere formal breach of the law;
likewise, it is more than the subjective ethical disvalue of the actor. Harm,
as such, has only a negative meaning. It expresses the risk of destruction
or the destruction itself of something valuable. It must, therefore, be
related to the material objects which are impaired by the unlawful conduct. Only if considered in connection with the material objects it injures
can harm be described in a more positive way.
The material objects against which penal harm is directed are found in
legally protected interests. Hence, criminal harm can be characterized as
the negation, endangering, or destruction of the legal interests of the
respective criminal provisions. Because of this close interdependence of
the notion of harm and the legal interest, the definition of harm finally
depends on the determination of the legal interest.
At this point the main problems are clear. There is always the danger
that legal interests; through over-abstraction, become comprehended as
fundamental values or ideals. In particular, Jerome Hall, by emphasizing
the intangible nature of penal harm, neared the point at which legal interests are nothing more than general values of purely idealistic subsistence. By overemphasizing the incorporeality of penal harm, one overlooks
the realistic, sociological fundament of legal interests. It is also important
to note the fact that interests and values of a more general nature, such
as that of the government in the functioning of its administrative machinery, often can be broken down into many smaller interests: the incorruptibility of the civil servants, the obedience to administrative measures,
the inviolability of public institutions, etc. This necessary process of reconciliation by which a more fundamental interest is reconciled by and
protected through more specific interests" 9 is only one of many signs that
the concept of legal interests is rooted in the sociological basis of the values
to be protected. If the concept of legal interest is, however, oriented
329. Cf. SAX, op. cit. supra note 246.
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strictly to the intangibility of generally conceived universal values, the
weapons of criminal law are in danger of overlooking the real needs of
the society.
However, the other extreme, that of overstressing the sociological side
of legal interests, is equally incorrect. This mistake was made by Beutel
in that he failed to recognize the normative, selective function of the law,
with the result that any social demand, desire; or need would have to be
legally protected.
In our opinion, the correct approach to a determination of the nature
of legal interests is the integrative combination of both the sociological
basis and the normative constitutional value. The requirement of a sociological basis demands that a certain sociologically grounded interest of
an individual, a social group, or the state must exist before the legislature
may provide any criminal measures.
Such interests need not necessarily be physically tangible elements or
goods of an external nature such as the body, a house, money, or water.
Goods, conditions, and relationships of more psychic or intellectual character may also be the substrata of protectable interests, e.g., the confidence
between trustee and beneficiary, cultural and religious institutions, or
interests such as the advancement of the aesthetic architectural standards
of a city, the citizens' rest on Sundays, or other valuable fact situations
and combinations such as the preservation of free competition or the
reputation of certain professions. However, as expressed by the value
aspect of legal interests, mere sociological existence alone does not justify
criminal protection. It must also be evaluated in terms of the order of
values established by the Constitution. Only those interests in harmony
with the spirit and the principles of the Constitution can be legally recognized, or, negatively phrased, all interests that do not have a normative
relationship to a certain constitutional value or that lie outside the constitutional order of values cannot achieve criminal protection, however
firm their sociological basis may be.
In this rather schematic summary, we have neglected one aspect of the
legal interests which divides their factual foundation and their legal evaluation, namely, the state of social recognition. That is to say that factual
interests do not immediately advance to legal evaluation; rather, they
must pass through the filter of social recognition. The consequence demands that only those interests which are so valuable and so significant
as to deserve social cognizance can finally obtain legal recognition and
criminal protection. 3 0
330. "Social recognition," however, does not infer the requirement of cognizance and
recognition of the whole society. This is, of course, the case with the traditional common
law crimes the interests of which are certainly universally recognized. But that is not so with
the modern public welfare offenses the purposes of which are often so technical that their
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Thus, the route which a certain social or individual want or need takes
in the process of becoming criminally sanctioned follows three steps: first,
there must be a socially founded factual interest; second, this interest
must be socially recognized; and third, its consistency with the constitutional value order must be demonstrated. Only then may it be criminally
protected.
Based on the dualistic, integrative structure of legal interests and the
three-step process of their sociological recognition, harm and legal interest
can be defined as follows. A "legal interest" worthy of criminal protection
may be any factual interest or good of an individual, of a social group,
or of the state if it is socially recognized and in harmony with the spirit
and value order as established by the Constitution. Consequently, "criminal harm," in its most general sense, is the negation, endangering, or
destruction of an individual, group, or state interest which was deemed
socially valuable, in harmony with the Constitution and, therefore, protected by a criminal sanction. In shorthand, "criminal harm" is the actual
or potential prejudice to socially and constitutionally recognized and
criminally sanctioned factual interests.
Consequences for Criminal Legislation
Although the theoretical analysis of harm as one of the fundamental
elements of crime was the primary objective of this study, it was not the
only purpose. We also intended to discover the principles according to
which the legislature may declare certain conduct unlawful and, therefore,
punishable.
Since harm is the objective, material substance of the crime as distinct
from the subjective requirement of mens rea, the starting point for our
inquiry must be that certain conduct cannot truly be called criminal unless
it causes certain criminal harm. This means that the legislature, before it
may outlaw certain acts or omissions by establishing criminal sanctions,
must first prove the likelihood of the harm potentially resulting from the
conduct to be outlawed. Since penal harm is the impairment of some legal
interest, conduct is only harmful if it is prejudicial to a legal interest.
Therefore, legislators must examine whether the objective they wish to
protect is in fact a legally protectable interest.
According to the dualistic nature of legal interests and with respect to
the three-step process of their recognition, legislators must establish proof
of these three points. First, they must determine that the objective to be
protected is a real interest and not merely an asserted, imagined, or prevalue is not intelligible for the average citizen. But here it suffices that the interests to be
protected are objectively of social relevance. In these cases the general social recognition is
substituted for by expert administrators of the branch of public welfare matters concerned.
Cf. ESER, op. cit. supra note 237, at 173-76.
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tended one. At a time when everyone is inclined to call for the strong arm
of government to protect his purely private wants, it is more important
than ever to examine whether there really is a need for criminal sanctions.
Too often the power of punishment is nothing more than a means of selfassertion without serving any real public or private need. In these cases,
the legislature should abstain from criminal measures for lack of a sociologically factual need or want. Equally important is the examination of
the social recognition of an asserted interest. That an interest must be
socially recognized as valuable to society as a whole or to some of its
members does not necessarily mean that only the interests of the whole
society or the state deserve protection. On the contrary, completely individual rights, such as property interests, can well merit criminal concern.
However, any interests (those the state as well as those of its subjects)
may be protected only if they are of social relevance. Sanctions equal in
social impact to criminal punishments are justified only if the interests
in favor of which punishment is created can be deemed socially valuable
and significant.3 3' Therefore, individual interests must also gain social
attention and recognition before they are worthy of criminal protection.
Still a third step must be taken: the claimed interest, though found to be
socially protectable, must finally be measured against the Constitution.
This is the normative step of constitutional evaluation. Needs or desires
of the highest social concern may not be criminally sanctioned if they are
not in accord with a value of the constitutional order. Concordance with
the constitutional spirit gives the interest its legal-constitutional value.
It is our understanding that the legislature may not penalize acts unless
the object against which these acts are directed is a legal interest. What
practical effects does this have on the applicability of the criminal provision if the object to be protected fails to meet these three criteria of a
legal interest? As to the factual-sociological side, if a criminal provision
does not serve a socially recognized and protectable interest, a criminal
sanction is unjustifiable. It must be held void since it deprives the "perpetrator" of life, liberty or property without due process or just cause.
As to the value aspect of the legal interest, i.e., its legal-constitutional
evaluation, the legislature must examine the protection of the claimed
socially recognized interest in harmony with the Constitution. If they are
not in harmony, the criminal sanction is unconstitutional.
Judicial Review of the Harm Requirement
Our proposition that the legislature may provide criminal sanctions only
for such conduct which is, in fact, harmful to some legal interest would
remain a mere phrase, an empty caveat, if it were left exclusively to lawmakers for application. If the harm requirement as an element of the
crime concept is to be given practical effect (and why should we establish
331. But compare note 330 supra.
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it as a principle of criminal liability if we are not willing to take it seriously?), we must look for the most effective means by which application
can be factually controlled and enforced. Although legislators may be
quite willing to restrict penal sanctions to acts which are likely to cause
some punishable harm, it is not impossible that in one case or another the
legislature may fail to recognize the factual harmlessness of the acts at
stake. Punishment in such a case, however, would mean that the "perpetrator" is punished for an act which injures no legal interest. In order to
avoid such unjust results, penal statutes must be reviewable by the courts.
Since, despite the most sincere legislative efforts, the harm is constantly
in danger of being neglected, judicial review is the only way to ensure
compliance with the principle of harm by the legislature.
A discussion of the practical application of judicial review must consider two distinct categories of cases:
(a) the situation in which the outlawed conduct is essentially not
capable or likely to do any harm to legal interests, and
(b) the situation in which the proscribed conduct is generally capable
of doing harm, but in the specific case at bar the proscribed harm
was in fact not accomplished.
The situation in which a criminal provision is essentially not even
capable of preventing a criminal harm arises in these three ways:
1. either the criminal statute serves a purpose which does not represent a real need or interest; or
2. its purpose, though serving a sociologically factual interest, is not
recognized by the community to be of such social and general significance as to be legally protected; or
3.

an interest, though recognized by the society, is included in the
Constitution because it is repugnant to higher ranking constitutional values or principles, or because it is inconsistent with the
utility and necessity principle.

In these cases, since a legal interest is not actually present, the proscribed conduct would, in fact, do no unlawful harm. Consequently, there
would be no just cause to punish. For that reason, the courts should have
the right to declare such criminal proscriptions invalid.
It is particularly in the field of public welfare offenses that provisions
are found which, as such, are perhaps quite capable of preventing a certain
criminal harm but where, under special circumstances, the formal breach
of those provisions does not cause the harm to be prevented. 3 2
The problem involved is a result of modem life. In the early days of
criminal law, when only the basic rights and interests of the community
332. For details to these cases see supra III.
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and its members were objects of public protection, it would rarely happen
that the breach of a criminal provision did not involve the injury of
interests for whose protection the provision was made. Modern technology
and legislation, however, have rendered life more refined and complicated.
Often it is extremely difficult to determine the real cause of a harmful
effect; without ascertaining this, how can one discern "harm-less" for
"harm-ful" activities? Therefore, the law can only prohibit a whole
agglomeration of supposedly dangerous acts by means of a general clause.
In so wholesale a method of outlawing conducts of a certain kind, it is
possible that completely harmless acts may also be prohibited. For example, in a statute which proscribes driving on the left side of the road, the
interest to be protected is the security of traffic. Is this public interest
really harmed if someone drives on the left side while the road is totally
free of traffic? What is the harm in crossing an intersection against a red
light at a time when the streets are completely empty? In these and in
many similar situations, we are faced with the startling observation that,
even though the proscribed conduct is present, the harm which the sanction is intended to prevent does not in fact occur. Here, the crucial question arises whether the perpetrator, although not causing the proscribed
harm; is nevertheless to be punished for breach of the law.
Against punishment on the one hand, one could raise the argument that
the state, having suffered no substantial harm, does not have a just cause
to punish. May the government sanction pure disobedience at all? Would
it not, in fact, be the same sort of injustice as that of Gessler, who ordered
Wilhelm Tell to salute his hat? Is this not inconsistent with the concept
of due process? On the other hand, on behalf of punishment, was not the
breach of the law at least a defiance of the legislative purpose? Is not the
law also placed in jeopardy by formally unlawful acts?
Within the limited scope of this study, it is impossible to attempt a
complete answer. This would require a more detailed investigation not
only into the problem of the state's right to punish but also into the general relationship between the state and the individual. Therefore, only
a solution in principle may be attempted. It certainly would be unjust to
punish one for a harm he did not actually cause. However, it is also incorrect to deny or to disregard the breach of the law completely. This
would be the socialist view of unlawfulness: no social dangerousness-no
unlawfulness-no crime. According to our own theory, however, a breach
of law results in unlawfulness, even if this be but a formal unlawfulness.
In our system of criminal justice, the material element of harm is not the
only element of the crime. Substance and form together constitute criminal conduct. Hence, even if certain prohibited conduct does not produce
the prohibited end, it nevertheless violates the law. Therefore, it would
be a mistake to consider the formally unlawful act as not having occurred
at all.
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The answer, of course; cannot be found in an invalidation of the statute
since the statute, as such, serves a proper purpose. There are two other
possible solutions to this dilemma: either the perpetrator might be punished for his contempt of the law according to a special contempt provision, thus disregarding the prohibition he had formally but, for lack of
harm, not materially violated, or the offender might be acquitted by means
of a procedural rule similar to § 153 of the German Criminal Procedure
CodeY By an analogous application of this procedural rule, the government would not prosecute acts which, though formally within the language
of the crime definition, did not cause the harm for which the criminal
sanction was designed. Thus, the state would waive its right to punish
the formal disobedience and acquit for lack of an appreciable harm. By
this procedural device, the formal breach of the law would not be denied,
while the perpetrator, on the other hand, would not be treated as a
criminal.
CONCLUSION
The problems, with which we have just briefly dealt, demonstrated that
the harm requirement is not a question of theory alone but is a principle
of highly practical concern. Beyond that, it is of considerable value for
the elucidation and determination of various other elements of the crime.
The crucial borderline between punishable attempt and non-punishable
preparation, for example, could be found much easier if more attention
were paid to the legal interests involved. The same holds true for the
difficult determination of "wrongdoing" as it is essential for the "awareness of wrongdoing" in the mens rea concept. Nor can the problem of the
consent of the victim be satisfactorily solved without considering the legal
interest the perpetrator has impaired. It would be interesting to inquire
into the close relationship which exists between legal interests and the
problems of merger and double jeopardy.
To investigate all of these implications of the harm principle would
probably necessitate a voluminous study. The limited purpose of this
analysis, however, has been achieved if it has made plain the eminent
importance of harm as the substance of the criminal wrong, as a fulcrum
of the substantive unlawfulness, thus, as the objective ratio essendi of the
crime in addition to the subjective personal elements of mens rea.
333. The full text of this provision is reproduced in note 85 supra. According to this
rule the perpetrator is acquitted if his guilt and the consequences of his act are insignificant.

